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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Brian Vander Naald
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2012
Title: Essays in Environmental and Public Economics
Benefit-cost analysis of environmental policies typically focuses on benefits to
human health and well-being. When it comes to humans’ WTP for improvements in
the quality of life for other species, however, the evidence is limited. We argue that
the other-species morbidity-reduction component of WTP should be calculated net
of any “outrage” component associated with the cause of the harm. This net WTP
is likely to be correlated with the premium that people are willing to pay for chicken
products from birds for which the quality of life has been enhanced by improved
animal welfare measures. This paper uses a conjoint choice stated preference survey
to reveal the nature of systematic heterogeneity in preferences for “humanely raised”
versus “conventionally raised” chicken. We also use latent class analysis to distinguish
between two classes of people – those who are willing to pay a premium for humanely
raised chicken and those who are not.
iv
Proposition 21 on California’s 2010 ballot concerned an $18 annual surcharge
on vehicles to support state parks. Prop 21 failed, implying 25% of these parks risk
closure. Voting patterns at the Census tract level depend on gross price, incomes,
age profiles, political ideology, environmental preferences, the availability of local
substitutes, and park salience. We simulate counterfactual scenarios under which
Prop 21 might have passed and use county-level hold-out samples to illustrate the
predictive ability of our model.
The California Air Resources Board is slowly phasing out perchloroethylene
as the main input in dry cleaning operations in the state. Exploiting differential
implementation of this regulation between SCAQMD (South Coast Air Quality
Management District) and the rest of the state, we examine the effect of this
regulation on the propensity for dry cleaning businesses to exit the industry. We
find that regulation has encouraged early exit from the industry in some cases. We
also find that regulation decreased ambient concentrations of perchloroethylene in
the atmosphere.
This dissertation contains both published and unpublished co-authored
material. It also contains an appendix for chapter II as a supplemental file.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The common threads throughout this dissertation are both environmental
economic and political economic in nature. The second chapter uses techniques
common to environmental economics to estimate WTP values for other species’ well-
being. The third chapter uses voting results to estimate demand for public parks
funding. The fourth chapter examines the effects of an environmental regulation on
an industry comprise of mostly small businesses, using the dry-cleaning industry in
California as an example.
The second chapter of this dissertation is entitled “WTP for other species’
wellbeing”. Using a conjoint choice state preference survey, we find that some portions
of the population possess a positive WTP premium for humanely raised meat, which
we argue is likely to be positively correlated with concern for the wellbeing of other
animals. Using latent class analysis, we also find what appear to be two distinct
classes of people: those with a positive WTP premium and those who do not have a
positive WTP premium.
The third chapter of this dissertation is titled “Payment Vehicles for Public
Goods: Evidence from California State Parks”. Proposition 21 on California’s
2010 ballot concerned an $18 annual surcharge on vehicles to support state parks.
Owners of vehicles registered in California would then be excused from paying
park user fees. Prop 21 failed, resulting in 25% of these parks being scheduled
for closure. Voting patterns at the Census tract level depend on gross price (the
average per-household number of vehicles), incomes, age profiles, political ideology,
environmental preferences, the availability of local substitutes, and park salience.
We simulate counterfactual scenarios under which Prop 21 might have passed and
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use county-level hold-out samples to illustrate the predictive ability of our model.
The title of the final chapter is “The Effects of Environmental Regulation
on Dry-cleaning Firm Exits”. In compliance with the Clean Air Act, the state of
California has implemented a phase down of the chemical perchloroethylene (PCE),
which is the most widely used technology in dry-cleaning operations. PCE has been
shown to be carcinogenic. We examine the determinants of dry cleaners’ decisions
to exit the industry or continue business as usual, as well as if the regulations were
effective in reducing ambient concentrations of PCE. We use data from the National
Establishment Time Series (NETS) database for business characteristics, data from
the SCAQMD, and data from the Census and ACS for neighborhood characteristics,
as well as emissions data from the California Air Resources Board. We do not find
evidence that the regulations adversely affected dry cleaners, although we do find
that the regulation reduced the ambient concentration of PCE in the atmosphere.
Chapters II, III, and IV contain material co-authored with Trudy Ann
Cameron.
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CHAPTER II
WTP FOR OTHER SPECIES’ WELL-BEING
Introduction
Benefit-cost analysis of environmental policies typically pays a great deal of
attention to benefits in the form of protection or enhancement of the health and well-
being of humans. Researchers have therefore produced an abundance of evidence
about willingness to pay (WTP) for reductions in human mortality risks. There
is also considerable evidence regarding WTP for reductions in human morbidity
risks, and other quality-of-life benefits such as improved visibility or reduced noise.
For environmental risks to other species, researchers have also had some success in
measuring people’s WTP to increase the abundance of an endangered species, for
example, or to preserve biodiversity (see Richardson and Loomis (2009) for a meta-
analysis). However, these values are mostly for reductions in mortality risks for
other species. There is considerably less evidence concerning WTP for reductions in
morbidity risks for other species, or to protect other aspects of their quality of life.
It is important for economists to consider human values for other-species
morbidity risk reductions because environmental economists are often criticized for
their anthropocentric view of the value of environmental quality. Morbidity risk
reductions for other species have standing in conventional benefit-cost analyses only
if humans are willing to pay something for these reductions. Accordingly, this study
seeks to isolate additional evidence of human WTP for quality-of-life improvements
for other species.
Of course, the view one takes of environmental valuation efforts depends upon
one’s philosophical framework. Many people take a deontological view. They feel
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that the protection of other species is a categorical imperative and that the well-
being of other species has intrinsic value, independent of the relationship between
these species and humans. Other observers, however, subscribe to a teleological
view, where other species have utilitarian value to the extent that their well-being
matters (ultimately) to the well-being of humans. As economists, we take the more
pragmatic teleological view. We steer away from normative ethical issues and address
the positive question of people’s willingness to pay for improvements in the well-
being of other species. Our work is motivated by recognition that benefits stemming
from the well-being of non-human species should be represented more frequently in
environmental benefit-cost analyses.
This component of environmental benefits is rarely included in benefit-cost
analyses because there has been relatively little research available. For example,
consider a benefit-cost analysis of a prospective environmental regulation that would
reduce the chance of a coastal oil spill, for example. It would be inappropriate to
attempt to transfer, to all potentially injured birds, a measure of WTP to prevent the
death of a brown pelican. Brown pelicans are atypical, since they have been recently
de-listed as an endangered species. Likewise, suppose we were considering an estimate
of the benefits of a regulation aimed at preventing non-fatal rodenticide poisoning
of common barn owls. Such a benefits estimate should not rely upon measures of
WTP to protect endangered spotted owls, whose survival has been linked to the
preservation of old-growth forests. If we want to isolate a component of WTP that
pertains solely to the well-being of the animal itself, while it is still alive, we need a
context that is not confounded by endangered species status or symbolic values. We
need estimates of WTP limited to the well-being of the living animal, not conflated
with other values such as WTP associated only with reductions in mortality. WTP
to improve the quality-of-life of farm animals would seem to be the ideal measure of
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this component of value, since these animals tend to be numerous and ordinary. This
WTP, if anything, would serve as a lower bound for WTP to improve the well-being
of a more charismatic species. Furthermore, the reduction of mortality risks is not an
issue, in this case, because most of these animals are raised specifically to be killed
for food.
Human WTP on behalf of other humans, of course, requires consideration of
the nature of the altruism involved and the prospect for double counting.1 However,
double-counting is not a concern when animal well-being is involved because the
animals themselves are not part of the franchise for benefit-cost analysis and animals’
WTP values on their own behalf will not otherwise be counted.
A challenge in this line of research is that there are relatively few familiar
market contexts in which consumers need to consider their willingness to incur
the costs necessary to provide clean air or water or an otherwise safe and healthy
environment for both wild and domesticated animals. In this paper, we assume that
consumers’ WTP for these types of benefits will be correlated with their willingness
to pay higher supermarket prices so that farm animals raised for food can be provided
with a better quality of life.
In this study, we use survey data to measure consumers’ incremental
willingness to pay for “free range” and “humanely raised” poultry versus
“conventionally raised” poultry, and demonstrate numerous statistically significant
dimensions of heterogeneity in preferences for animal welfare improvements. We find
that the per-pound premium willingly paid for the humanely raised product varies
inversely with household size and with the respondent’s rating of his or her own
1If altruism is non-paternalistic, in the sense that people care only about other people’s levels
of utility, then aggregate WTP may be merely the sum of individual WTP amounts. If altruism
is paternalistic, so that people care about other people’s levels of consumption of specific goods,
then there is sometimes room to include people’s WTP on behalf of others as well as on their own
behalf.
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ideological conservatism. In contrast, this premium varies directly with educational
attainment and the extent to which the respondent is concerned about antibiotics,
growth hormones, and genetic engineering. It also varies directly with the extent
to which the respondent believes that the humanely raised product is healthier for
humans and with the extent to which he or she believes that humane standards for
farm animal care actually improve the well-being of these animals.
Additionally, we explore a model where we identify two distinct latent
preference classes. Both classes are sensitive to prices, but one preference class
derives positive utility from free-range and humanely raised products, and the other
is clearly unwilling to pay any premium at all for free-range or humanely raised
products.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the rationale for our
approach as a function of the institutional context and then briefly reviews the
scope of the related literature and differentiates our inquiry from other existing work.
Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 lays out our model and the corresponding
estimating specification. Section 5 presents our results and some discussion, and
Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Context and Broader Literature
A Missing but Potential Market
Our study is based upon a consumer survey that involves so-called “stated
preferences,” elicited via sets of conjoint choice experiments, to determine which
types of consumers are more or less willing to pay for improved farm animal welfare,
as well as the magnitude of this WTP.2 A stated preference survey is necessary to
2Methods such as these are widely used in the marketing and transportation choice literatures,
as well as in environmental and health economics contexts. They are sometimes the only available
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assess WTP for humane treatment of farm animals because there is no uniform set
of criteria permitting an unambiguous definition of “humanely raised” meats. Thus
the product in question is not yet well-defined. U.S. Federal law currently requires
only that animals raised for meat be made unconscious before being slaughtered,
because farm animals are exempt from other federal animal welfare laws (US Code:
Humane Methods for Livestock Slaughter, Title 7, chapter 8). Conventional methods
of raising animals for food have proven cost-effective for farmers, and these practices
often include maximizing the density of animals, using growth-inducing hormones,
and using feed that includes animal by-products. Raising animals in high densities
forces many farms to physically alter the animals by, for example, cutting tails,
toes, and beaks so that they cannot injure one another. It also forces producers to
regularly administer antibiotics to control disease.
While “humanely raised” products are not widely available, many grocery
stores do carry meat products labeled “free-range” which fetch a substantial price
premium–in some instances as much as four times the price of conventionally raised
meats. However, a portion of the premium that consumers are willing to pay for
free-range meats has been attributed to concerns for human health and safety as well
as ethical concerns – both for the environment and for the welfare of the animals
themselves. Unfortunately, a “free-range” label has essentially no legal meaning or
standard certifying body, so this designation does not correspond to a well-defined
product either. Nevertheless, existing price premia for free-range meats suggest that
there may also be a substantial unmet demand for some form of certification ensuring
that the animal in question has been raised humanely.
method for measuring prospective demand for new products or non-market demands for public
goods.
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Of course, it is an empirical challenge to attribute a WTP premium for free-
range or humanely raised meats solely to the consumer’s interest in animal welfare.
In the choice scenarios presented in our survey, we are careful to stipulate that “The
store offers three brands of chicken breasts that look the same. The color, size and fat
content of each brand are very similar. The only visible difference is that one brand
is market ‘Conventional,’ one brand is marked ‘Free-range,’ and the third brand is
marked ‘Humane.’ ” But consumers may believe that the products are likely to differ
in other ways that are not visible. For example, they may believe that free-range
or humanely raised products are more (or less) healthy for human consumption,
that they are more tender (or tougher), or that they are more or less tasty than
conventionally raised products. It seemed improbable that all consumers would
accept that the three types of products would be identical on all of these dimensions,
so we have been careful to elicit each respondent’s subjective perceptions on these
three quality dimensions: healthiness, tenderness, and tastiness. This permits us
to control for these perceptions and, if necessary, to simulate counterfactually what
consumers would have been willing to pay had they perceived that all three products
were identical on these dimensions as well.3
Relevant Literature
Farm animal welfare has been a topic of growing interest in recent years in the
agricultural economics literature, but we seek via this study to increase the attention
of environmental and ecological economists to analogous concerns about wildlife,
including how these concerns might factor into benefit-cost analysis of environmental
policies.
3A set of five Appendices accompanies this dissertation. Appendix A contains a few additional
institutional details. These appendices are available as a supplemental file to the dissertation.
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Well-being of other species.–Relatively little work has yet been published
that emphasizes other-species morbidity reductions as a potentially important
source of concomitant social benefits from environmental regulations, and none
appears to have been formally economic in nature. However, Blumstein (2010)
describes how forest management practices can create noise, frighten animals,
and lead to heightened glucocorticoid levels in wildlife, along with disruption to
their communication and reproduction. Mathews (2010) describes how agricultural
activity can affect wild animal welfare and conservation, arguing in particular that
the suffering of pest animals has traditionally been undervalued. Paquet and
Darimont (2010) confirm our premise by noting that “the notion that animal welfare
applies to wildlife has escaped many animal welfarists and conservationists.” These
authors adopt a deontological perspective and focus on the example of the grey
wolf and how habitat destruction and impoverishment causes trauma, suffering, and
death for this species. We argue that these considerations are potentially important
in formal benefit-cost analyses as well.
Economic animal welfare studies.–This literature seems to begin with
Bennett (1997), followed by Bennett (1998), Bennett et al. (2002), Bennett and
Blaney (2002), and Bennett and Blaney (2003). This early work relies most heavily
upon contingent valuation methods. Glass et al. (2005) find that a significant subset
of the population appears to be unwilling to pay anything at all for the welfare of
pigs (and this heterogeneity is fully consistent with the findings of the present paper).
Schnettler et al. (2009) find that consumers care both about humane treatment
and the geographic origin of their beef. Taylor and Signal (2009) find that certain
demographic characteristics, such as age, income, and gender, are important in
determining WTP for humane practices for food animals. This last paper is perhaps
closest to our own work, although a number of other papers also use animal welfare
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questions as a vehicle for an examination of important methodological issues; these
include Chilton et al. (2006), Carlsson et al. (2007) and Bateman et al. (2008).
Confounding attributes.–Other potentially confounding product attributes
are considered in some studies. Carlucci et al. (2009) and Napolitano et al. (2008)
have used an auction procedure to study yogurt products. Along with animal
welfare as a product attribute, they include other competing attributes such as
sensory properties of the product. These are akin to the attributes of perceived
healthiness, tastiness, and tenderness employed in our own study, as discussed
above. Similarly, Nilsson et al. (2006) consider broader features like food safety,
environmental degradation, and animal welfare as competing attributes which affect
WTP for a product.
Biodiversity.–There are several papers which seek to estimate WTP to
preserve biodiversity or to retain numbers of individuals belonging to an endangered
species. For example, in selected recent work, Han and Lee (2008) use both stated and
revealed preference methods to assess WTP values for preservation of Manchurian
black bears in South Korea. Eiswerth and van Kooten (2009) use a model of optimal
management policy to determine the economically optimal stock of the greater sage
grouse in Nevada. Meta-analytic methods are used by Richardson and Loomis (2009)
to reveal that WTP for preservation of endangered fauna has increased over time.
It is likely that some types of people will care only about numbers of live animals
in these contexts, but some people may also be concerned about the quality-of-life,
including non-fatal illnesses (morbidity), among other species. Others will place little
or no value on either the lives or the well-being of other species. We seek to identify
systematic patterns in the distribution, across the population, of these different
patterns of concern. This knowledge will help define the different constituencies
in terms of support for proposed policies or regulations.
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Demand for food attributes.–A few other papers investigate consumer
WTP for animal-based food products as a function of the attributes of that
food. There is a considerable literature that focuses on WTP for organic foods or
consumer preferences regarding genetically modified organisms (GMOs). However,
this literature focuses on the impact on the environment of different farming methods,
or to the uncertain risks to humans and other species stemming from alterations to
the global gene pool, food security, and human health implications. Examples of
this research include Larue et al. (2004), Farina and Almeida (2003), and Grunert
and Bech-Larsen (2005). Further, Balcombe et al. (2009) find that people prefer
bread made with wheat that has been grown with reduced levels of pesticides, while
Bougherara and Combris (2009) find that it is difficult to tease out private and public
components of WTP for environmentally friendly products, even in a controlled
experiment.
Sustainable agriculture.–Our paper is also related, although less closely,
to the literature on sustainable agriculture, where the interaction between food
production and ecosystems is a common theme. While the emphasis is more
commonly upon endangered species, the well-being of some type of wild species
is also implicit in the concerns about natural capital which are noted in most cases.
Some notable papers in this area of research include Goodland (1997), Johnston et al.
(2001), Rigby et al. (2001), Wilson and Tisdell (2001), and Van Passel et al. (2007)
Attitudes about animal welfare.–A number of authors in other social
science disciplines have surveyed consumers to learn about their attitudes concerning
animal welfare. For example, Tonsor et al. (2009) examined animal welfare
considerations for swine. Frewer et al. (2005) have looked at attitudes about livestock
welfare in general, while Schröder and McEachern (2004) considered value conflicts
for consumers in their purchasing decisions. Harper and Makatouni (2002) find that
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consumers typically have trouble separating the quality of meat from the welfare of
the animal. Some studies merely ask whether the consumer would be willing to pay
any positive premium over conventional products for a humanely raised alternative
(for example, Martelli (2009) and Ellis et al. (2009)). Recently, Nocella et al. (2010)
found that among certain EU countries, trust between consumer and producer had
a positive influence on consumer WTP for certified animal friendly products.
Methodological issues.–Several papers focus on methodological issues but
employ an animal welfare question as the vehicle for an empirical illustration. Choice
experiments were used by Carlsson et al. (2007) to derive WTP in the context of
animal welfare considerations for cattle and broilers. Liljenstolpe (2008) explores a
random parameters logit model in this context. Bateman et al. (2008) employ animal
welfare related survey data, but the main focus of their analysis is methodological. As
always, stated preference methods have received the expected scrutiny. Chilton et al.
(2006) use a farm animal welfare application to raise questions about the reliability
of stated preference methods because they do not find strong convergence between
WTP based methods and matching methods for identical populations.
Voting data.–There is some revealed preference data that can convey
attitudes about improvements to animal welfare in the form of voting behavior on
a handful of propositions (referenda) in a few U.S. states. Vederas (2006) considers
a 2002 Florida ballot proposal to limit farming practices that were deemed to be
cruel to pigs. To explain county-level voting data, religion was a statistically and
economically relevant variable, but political preferences and socio-economic factors
are determined to be of greater importance than religious affiliation.
Other approaches.–Frank (2008) asks whether there is a type of Kuznets
Curve for animal welfare. Thiermann and Babcock (2005) consider globalization,
interest in animal welfare worldwide, and the prospect for international standards
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on animal welfare. Other voices raise familiar questions from the non-economic
community, for example Mann (2005), who argues that the design of “ethological”
farm programs should be based on “broad public discussions as described by
deliberation theorists rather than willingness-to-pay studies.
Survey Data
Our stated preference survey is presented to respondents as data collection
to support background research concerning the viability of a potential new meat-
certifying and labeling program. Randomized baseline prices are quoted for a
“conventional” product, and randomized price premia for “free-range” and “humanely
raised” products are used to generate the prices quoted for these other products.
Our conjoint choice stated preference survey was designed and fielded in 2006.
To obtain a relatively random sample of the adult population of one county in the
U.S. at relatively low cost, we collected responses from the jury pool at the county
courthouse in our own jurisdiction. The jury pool population consists of adults
selected at random from lists of registered voters and licensed drivers residing in the
county.4
In our survey, respondents were presented with choice scenarios where they
were asked to consider whether to purchase a given quantity and type of chicken
breasts, assuming that they were on a typical food shopping trip. We analyze
two such choices for each individual in our sample. Each choice involves three
4Survey booklets were hand-delivered to the jury assembly room. The survey was announced
with a neutral description of its topic and the fact that it was the basis for an academic research
project at the local university. A sealed “ballot box” was provided for the return of completed
surveys, and additional surveys were left near the box with a placard containing the same
explanation that had been delivered verbally. Survey completion was not monitored. The completed
surveys were collected later. The result is a sample of convenience, and there is no way to measure
response rates accurately. The sample is similar to the general population of the U.S. on many
observable dimensions other than race, but there is no way to assess the possibility of systematic
selection on unobservables.
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packages of chicken breasts of a specified common weight (between 1.5 to 3 pounds)
and three different types (conventional, free-range, or humanely raised), as well as
a no-purchase option. Since certified humanely raised products were not widely
available at the time of our survey, respondents clearly had to base their expectations
about their potential demand for these products on the descriptions of humane
farming practices provided in our survey and extrapolation from the characteristics
of various free-range or organic products more commonly available at the time. Few
respondents would have had any actual experience with certified humanely raised
products. Online Appendix B describes our survey design and the resulting data
in greater detail. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our
estimating specification.5
One concern with stated-preference surveys is that some respondents may
tend to overstate their willingness to pay. Possible reasons for this include an attempt
to please the researcher or the hope that by overstating WTP, the good or service
in question will be provided and the respondent’s option to buy the good in the
future will be preserved. To limit this behavior, respondents were informed that a
charitable organization funded by other concerned individuals would be established
to certify meat as “humanely raised.” However, this would happen only if it was
determined that a large enough share of the general population was willing to pay
the necessary price premium in the hypothetical shopping scenarios presented in
the survey. Respondents were further reminded that it was important for this
organization to receive realistic information about potential demand. Should the
organization go ahead with the meat-certifying program, they would not be able to
5Since several of the attitudinal variables employ a seven-point rating scale, Figure B1 in Online
Appendix B also provides histograms for the complete distributions of each of these ratings.
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fund other worthy causes that the respondent might also care about. This framing of
the choice task represents an effort to make the respondent’s choices “consequential.”
Another concern with survey data is that respondents may attempt to second-
guess the motivation of the research team in asking these questions. To minimize
any perception of bias in our survey, we were careful to present both the pros and
the cons of the proposed programs. We also posed a direct query about researcher
bias in our debriefing questions: “Think about the way the information in this survey
was presented. How important do you think it is to this research team for people
to buy humanely raised meat products?” Perceptions ran the gamut from “1 = Not
at all important” to “4 = Neutral” to “7 = Extremely important.” We were pleased
to see that the modal value was 4, but more people gave high ratings than low
ratings. Of course, it is difficult to avoid completely the impression that we care
about humane treatment of farm animals since respondents will impute this to a
certain extent from the fact that we are conducting the study at all. Fortunately,
use of this variable as a potential shifter of estimated preference parameters yielded
no statistically significant effects.6
Model and Estimating Specification
There are two standard ways to used stated preference methods to derive
WTP measures for non-market or pre-test-market goods. One technique, sometimes
called “stated behavior,” describes a possible market to respondents and asks how
many units of the product in question they would choose to purchase per period,
say per month or per year. These data on quantities demanded per period can
then be modeled as functions of income and prices, based on the microeconomic
6Best-practice protocols for the conduct of stated preference survey were observed to the fullest
extent permitted by the resources available for this study. Many standard conventions for mail
surveys are relevant in this context. See Dillman (2000), for example.
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construct known as a Marshallian demand curve. The other common technique,
employed here, involves asking respondents about single choice occasions, where
a given selection would be made under a particular set of conditions. When the
choice scenario involves multiple alternatives and multiple varying attributes for each
alternative, this method is commonly called “conjoint choice” analysis. If the choice
is merely to buy a specified product (vote for a public good) or not, this method is
often called a “contingent valuation”. Consumer choices are then explained using a
so-called discrete-choice “random utility” econometric model where the parameters
to be estimated are interpreted as marginal utilities associated with net income and
with the quantities of each attribute. Given these estimated marginal utilities, it is
straightforward to solve for the implied Marshallian demands. The conjoint choice
approach asks only that respondents contemplate specific choice occasions, rather
than ponder their cumulative purchases across many choice occasions. Conjoint
choice tasks are thus viewed by many researchers to be easier for survey respondents.
We will develop our model in the context of Choice Scenario #1, an example
of which is depicted in Figure 1. Respondents encountered this first choice set on
the sixth page of the survey instrument. Indirect utility for each alternative in the
choice set is considered to be a function of (1) the individual’s income remaining
after the purchase decision and (2) the quantity of the product purchased. The
“no-purchase” alternative, of course, involves no cost. The simple equations below
describe utility U ji as a function only of the cost of the package, c
j
i , and quantity
of product contained in the package, qji , described to subject i for each alternative
j = C,F,H,N (where C = conventionally raised, F = free-range, H = humanely
raised, and N = no purchase). For the moment, we ignore the differences in utility
that might stem from different attributes of each type of meat, so the indirect utility
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function involves only two parameters: βY , the marginal utility of net income, and
β, the marginal utility of a pound of chicken:
U ji = βY (Yi − cji ) + βqji + ηji , j = C,F,H
UNi = βY (Yi) + η
N
i
Net indirect utilities for the model, calculated relative to the “no-purchase”
or “status-quo” option, are then:
∆U ji = (U
j
i − UNi ) = βY (−cji ) + βqji + (ηji − ηNi ) = ∆V ji + ji j = C,F,H
(II.1)
McFadden’s conditional logit choice model (Greene (2008), p. 846-847)
assumes that subjects will prefer the alternative that conveys the highest attainable
indirect utility in the choice set. The stochastic structure of the conditional logit
model (i.e. the distributions typically assumed for Ci , Fi , and Hi ) leads to choice
probabilities that can be expressed in terms of the observable portions of utility for
product types j = C,F,H and the no-purchase alternative, N :
P ji =
exp
(
V ji − V Ni
)
exp (V Ci − V Ni ) + exp (V Fi − V Ni ) + exp (V Hi − V Ni ) + 1
PNi =
1
exp (V Ci − V Ni ) + exp (V Fi − V Ni ) + exp (V Hi − V Ni ) + 1
To estimate the main unknown utility parameters βY (the marginal indirect utility
for income) and β (the marginal utility per generic pound of chicken, for example)
the following log-likelihood function is maximized:
L =
n∏
i=1
[
PCi
]Ci [
P Fi
]Fi [
PHi
]Hi [
PNi
]Ni (II.2)
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where Ci = 1 if person i chooses the conventionally raised product and Ci = 0
otherwise; similarly for Fi, Hi and Ni.
Once the parameters of the indirect utility function are estimated, it is possible
to solve for the individual’s maximum WTP for a package of chicken of a specified
weight. This maximum WTP is the price at which the individual would be just
indifferent between paying for and consuming the product, and not paying for the
product, thereby forgoing consumption. Indifference implies identical utility between
these two options, or a zero utility difference, so we set the estimated indirect utility
difference relative to the numeraire alternative equal to zero for j = C,F,H and solve
for the package cost, cji
∗
, that satisfies the equality 0 = ∆V ji = βY (−cji
∗
) + βqji + 
j
i .
This implies:
βY (c
j
i
∗
) = βqji + 
j
i ⇒ cji
∗
=
βqji + 
j
i
βY
=
(
β
βY
)
qji +
(
ji
βY
)
(II.3)
where ji = (η
j
i − ηNi ) . This amount, cji
∗
, calculated from the maximum likelihood
estimates of the two utility parameters, is interpreted as the maximum WTP for qji .
We note that this can be expected to match the market equilbrium price for chicken
breasts only for the marginal consumer. For inframarginal consumers, this WTP can
be expected to exceed the market equilibrium price.
The error term in equation (II.3), ji/βY , is symmetric around zero, so its
expected value can be assumed to be zero. The expected value of maximum WTP
for a package of generic chicken is thus β/βY times the quantity (pounds) of chicken
in the package, qji . In other words, maximum WTP per pound of chicken is given by
the ratio of the marginal utility per pound of chicken, β, to the marginal utility per
dollar of income, βY .
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In this study, however, our main research question concerns differences across
types of chicken in this WTP amount. Thus we allow the marginal utility per
pound of chicken to vary systematically with the type of chicken (conventional, free-
range or humanely raised.) The baseline marginal utility, βC , will be assigned to
conventionally raised chicken, but the marginal utility per pound of chicken will be a
systematic varying parameter that shifts by δF if the chicken is free-range, and by δH
if the chicken is humanely raised. Thus the indirect utility-differences for j = C,F,H
that drive the choices will be generalized via appropriate interaction terms:
∆U ji = βY (−cji ) + (βC + δFF ji + δHHji )qji + ji
= βY (−cji ) + βCqji + δFF ji qji + δHHji qji + ji (II.4)
where F ji = H
j
i = 0 if the product is conventional, F
j
i = 1 if the product is free-range
(0 otherwise), and Hji = 1 if the product is humanely raised (0 otherwise). Solving
for the maximum WTP for a package of chicken yields
Max WTP = cji
∗
=
(βC + δFF
j
i + δHH
j
i )q
j
i
βY
+
ji
βY
(II.5)
A statistical test of the hypothesis that respondents are willing to pay no
more for free-range meats than for conventional meats is a test of δF = 0 . Likewise,
a test of the hypothesis that respondents are willing to pay no more for humanely
raised meats is a test of δH = 0. If these parameters prove to be positive and
statistically significantly different from zero, then a point estimate of the per-pound
premium willingly paid for the free-range product is δF/βY and a point estimate of
the per-pound premium willingly paid for the humanely raised product is δH/βY .
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To accommodate systematic heterogeneity in preferences across our sample, as
a function of individual characteristics and perceptions, we next generalize each scalar
preference parameter in equation (II.4) to be a systematic varying parameter. We
introduce potentially different types and numbers of shift variables for each marginal
utility, including variables Zi for the marginal utility of income, and variables XCi ,
XFi , and XHi for the marginal utility of the conventionally raised product and the
differentials in marginal utility for the free-range and humanely raised products.
Each vector of variables also includes a constant term. The resulting more-general
utility difference can be written to emphasize these systematically varying marginal
utilities, or to establish the specific second- and third-order interaction terms required
to estimate the four parameter vectors:
∆U ji = (βYZi)
(−cji)+ [ (βCXCi )+ (δFXFi )F ji + (δHXHi )Hji ] qji
= βY
(−Zicji)+ [ βC (XCi qji )+ δF (XFi F ji qji )+ δH (XHi Hji qji ) ] (II.6)
If we assume linearity as in equation (6), this generalization means that the
fitted TWTP for a package of chicken (of weight qji pounds) is given by
TWTP ji =
(
1
βYZi
)[ (
βCX
C
i
)
+
(
βFX
F
i
)
F ji +
(
βHX
H
i
)
Hji
]
qji (II.7)
Then the per-pound premium for the free-range and humanely raised product will
be simply the partial derivatives with respect to the type and the quantity:
∂2TWTP ji
∂Fi∂q
j
i
=
δFX
F
i
βYZi
;
∂2TWTP ji
∂Hi∂q
j
i
=
δHX
H
i
βYZi
(II.8)
These ratios are nonlinear functions of the asymptotically joint normal maximum
likelihood parameter estimates, so we use simulation methods to build up a sampling
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distribution of values for these key derivatives with respect to each statistically
significant shift variable. Ultimately, we are interested in the further derivatives
of these premia with respect to the variables in Zi and XFi .
Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents parameter estimates for the simplest possible homogeneous-
preferences specification that still permits an estimate of the premium for the
humanely raised product. The marginal utilities are assumed to be common across
all individuals and the only distinction made is between the three different types of
products. Calculated simply as δH/βY , these estimates suggest a WTP premium for
the humanely raised product of about $0.58 per pound.
However, we are particularly interested in evidence of systematic heterogeneity
in these WTP amounts. If we understand the patterns in WTP for humanely
raised products, we will understand better the types of constituencies which will
be especially important when it comes to benefit-cost analysis of environmental
regulations (or other public policies) where one type of benefit is prevention of non-
fatal harm to other species. Table 3 provides the maximum likelihood parameter
estimates for our preferred (parsimonious) model with heterogeneous preferences.
This is again one single model, although the estimates in the middle section of the
table are arranged in three columns to highlight the base marginal utility for the
conventional product in the first column and the differentials in marginal utility for
the free-range and humanely raised products in the next two columns, with each of
the rows showing the dimensions of statistically significant heterogeneity in this base
marginal utility and the two differentials.7
7As usual, this specification is a result of extensive exploration across a larger array of potential
sources of heterogeneity. The basic homogenous-preferences specification in Table 2 demonstrates
that there is a statistically significant utility differential for humanely raised products. All of the
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The first interesting result in Table 3 is the effect of gender on the parameter
which gives the marginal utility of income. Females display a marginal utility of
income that is greater than that for males, which tends on average to decrease their
willingness to pay for anything (a fairly typical result in consumer choice analysis).
A tendency for women to be less willing to pay for any of these products, including
any premium for the humanely raised products, contrasts with the attitudinal study
by Prickett et al. (2010) where support for animal welfare measures is particularly
strong for females. It seems their higher marginal utilities of income dominate their
greater sentiments for animal welfare in an economic analysis.8,9
In this paper, however, we are particularly interested in the third column
in the body of Table 3. The per-pound WTP premium for the humanely raised
product is given by δH divided by the marginal utility of income (which is βY 0
for males and (βY 0 + βY 1) for females). Since δH varies according to the values
of several respondent characteristics and attitudes, so will the WTP premium for
humanely raised products. Table 3 thus illustrates that WTP varies inversely with
household size and with the respondent’s rating of his or her own degree of ideological
other specifications we have considered are generalizations of that simple model. The surviving
covariates in Table 3 are retained because they tend to be robustly statistically significant across
alternative specifications. Note that the coefficient on the negative of total price, in a model that
is linear in net income, gives the marginal utility of income.
8Although one usually expects declining marginal utilities of income, the estimated marginal
utility of income in our sample does not seem to change as income increases. We find this result
despite having introduced income into the model in a variety of different ways in our exploratory
analyses.
9An anonymous referee asked about the preferences of respondents who reported that they
did not know the prices of the conventional or free-range products they consume. We provide
online Appendix E with some additional results. Table E-1 reports results for two models which
use indicators for respondents who buy conventional or free-range products but do not know the
typical price of the product. These models reveal evidence consistent with these individuals having
a lower marginal utility of income (implying a less binding budget constraint and therefore a higher
WTP).
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conservatism.10 In contrast, the WTP premium varies directly with educational
attainment and the extent to which the respondent is concerned with farming
practices that involve antibiotics, growth hormones, and genetic engineering11. It also
varies directly with the extent to which the respondent believes that the humanely
raised product is healthier for humans12 and the extent to which he or she believes
that humane standards actually improve the well-being of animals.13 While we
collected numerous other attitudinal variables, sufficient orthogonality to permit
identification of separate effects was present only for these few variables. To the
extent that these variables are collinear with other attitudes, of course, these included
variables (used alone) will pick up some of these other effects.
Interestingly, in an alternative specification not reported here, we find no
statistically significant lump-sum effect on fitted indirect utility associated solely with
the product being conventional, free range, or humanely raised. Product type affects
the marginal utility per pound, not just the overall utility level per package. Thus,
the WTP premium for the humanely raised product is expected not to be associated
merely with the act of purchasing this type of product, but with the quantity
actually purchased. This makes it more likely that the premium reflects concern
about other-species well-being, rather than just potential “warm glow” from buying
the more socially desirable product. Furthermore, a simple distinction between the
10Survey question D.12: In terms of politics, how do you consider yourself? (1 = Extremely
liberal, . . ., 4 = Moderate, . . ., 7 = Extremely conservative)
11Survey question C.3: In choosing among different brands of chicken breasts, to what extent
were you thinking about antibiotics, growth hormones, or genetic engineering and how these might
affect chicken products? (1 = Not at all, . . ., 7 = A lot)
12Survey question A.6: Do you think that humanely raised meats might be more or less healthy
for people to eat than conventional meats? (1 = Much less health than conventional meats, . . .,4
= Equally healthy,. . .,7 = Much more healthy than conventional meats)
13Survey question A.4: How much do you think these requirements would actually improve the
wellbeing of livestock and poultry raised on certified farms? (1 = Not at all, . . ., 7 = a lot)
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no-purchase alternative and any of the three products also makes no statistically
significant difference in expected utility, despite the fact that many conjoint choice
studies with a no-purchase alternative find a significant “status quo” effect.14
It is not surprising that people are willing to pay a higher premium for
the humanely raised product if they believe that it is healthier for humans. We
expected that we might also see systematic effects on the WTP premium when
respondents believed that the humanely raised product was more desirable in other
ways as well, for example if it was expected to be tastier or more tender than the
conventional product. Opinions relating to the overall quality of humanely raised
versus conventional products tend to be somewhat positively correlated, so it proves
difficult to include all of them in a single specification and to achieve statistically
significant coefficients on each interaction term. Since the perceived “healthiness”
attribute seems to dominate, our preferred specification includes only that control
for these desirable attributes beyond simply the animal welfare dimension. Of course,
we acknowledge that the coefficient on the “healthiness” will certainly pick up some of
the explanatory power that would otherwise be attributed to tastiness or tenderness,
had there been more independent variation in the three types of perceptions.
The quantitative WTP implications of these parameter estimates are conveyed
in Table 4. This table describes distributions for the calculated value of the per-pound
WTP premium for the “humanely raised” product, based upon 1000 random draws
from the assumed joint normal distribution of the maximum likelihood parameters
estimates.15 It appears that female respondents are willing to pay a per-pound
premium for the humanely raised product that is about $0.19 lower for each extra
14Other alternative specifications are discussed in online Appendix C.
15A full table of results, including those for the “free-range” alternative, is included in online
Appendix D.
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person in their household. Likewise, the more ideologically conservative this female
respondent rates herself to be, the lower is the expected WTP premium for the
humanely raised product. Each rating point on the attitudinal scales for healthiness
and improvement to animal well-being increases the expected female WTP premium
for the humanely raised product by about $0.25 per pound. Concerns about
antibiotics, growth hormones, and genetic engineering have the greatest effects, with
each rating point increasing the premium by an average of $0.30 per pound for
females. All of the corresponding simulated WTP premiums for male respondents are
greater, of course, because the estimated marginal utility of income (which appears
in the denominator in each case) is smaller for males.
However, we are interested in simulating individual WTP for animal welfare
improvements alone; that is, WTP for reductions in morbidity for the species in
question, net of any WTP for the related human health impacts resulting from
consumption of these animals. For this purpose, it seems appropriate to impose the
following counterfactual condition: healthiness set at 4 = “equally healthy.” However,
there remains the question of the appropriate values to simulate for the other
attitudinal variables: “H. (humane standard) improves well-being” and “antibiotic
concerns.” We relegate this exploration to the online Appendices accompanying this
paper, but we will summarize the results here. Online Appendix Table D-2 begins
by reporting the size of the premium for the humanely raised product, evaluated first
at the marginal means of the data, across individuals, for each of the variables that
contribute to heterogeneity in these values. This premium is approximately $0.70
per pound, with a 95% interval that between $0.33 and $1.02 per pound. 16
16Subsequent rows of online Appendix Table D-2 display simulations for specified departures from
the overall sample mean values of the relevant variables, and asterisks highlight cases where the
fitted premium is bounded away from zero.
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In considering which of the WTP simulation results in Table D2 might be
most appropriate, we are inclined to allow respondents to retain their own subjective
opinions about the extent of any ill treatment that farm animals receive under
conventional farming methods. At the same time, we want to net out any component
of WTP that is explicitly due to the selfish perception that the humanely raised
product would be better for humans to consume (as opposed to being better for
the farm animal). Unfortunately, it is somewhat difficult to ensure that we have
completely achieved this goal. For the concerns about antibiotics, growth hormones,
and genetic engineering, we posed the question specifically in terms of “how these
might affect chicken products [emphasis added]” as opposed to the birds themselves.
However, we cannot rule out that respondents might reasonably have been worried
about the latter. If farming practices are not healthy for humans who consume these
products, then they are likely to be unhealthy for the animals in question as well.
With these considerations in mind, we believe that the best estimate of the
humanely raised premium may be the WTP calculated otherwise at the means of
the data, but with the “healthy” and “antibiotic concerns” ratings set equal to their
neutral values (i.e. 4). Fortunately, the mean value of the latter rating is 3.86, so
the distinction between the sample mean and the simulated value is minimal. This
implies that our best estimate of average household WTP for average subjective
improvements in animal welfare is about $0.34 per pound, but the 95% interval
includes everything from -$0.23 to +$0.82. For greater perceived improvements in
animal well-being, however, it is clear that people are willing to pay substantially
more for the humanely raised product.
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Latent Class models
When heterogeneity in preferences is introduced by allowing individual
utility parameters to vary systematically with observable characteristics and elicited
attitudes of the consumer, there are, in principle, as many unique different sets of
preferences as there are unique combinations of these characteristics and attitudes.
Sometimes, however, it is helpful to learn whether there might be some smaller
number of roughly distinct preference types. These can be construed as distinct
“market segments,” as opposed to the near-continuum of consumer types identified
in models like that in Table 3. A latent class model may be appropriate in this case.
Latent class models are based on the supposition that some small finite
number of different preference functions can be used to explain most people’s
choices. If membership in a preference class could be treated as deterministic,
indicator variables for each preference class could simply be used to shift each
preference parameter in the model. In a latent class model, however, membership in
preference classes is unobserved, and must be inferred by the researcher. A two-class
latent class model typically involves a class separation sub-model where respondent
characteristics are used to predict preference class membership. Then, conditional
on (stochastic) class membership, a distinct set of preference parameters is estimated
for each class.
We have explored a number of latent class specifications to determine how
many distinct preference types might be discerned in our data. It turns out that
at most two distinct preference classes are identifiable, as described in Table 5.17
17We programmed our latent class estimator in Matlab. Note that the numbering of the preference
classes as Class 1 and Class 2 is completely arbitrary. We also note that we tried a variety of three-
class models, but none could be coaxed to convergence. Point estimates may be construed to
suggest the possibility of a third preference class minimally distinct from Class 2 in Table 5, but
there appears to be insufficient information in the data to identify this third preference class.
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In the top portion of Table 5, it can be seen that individuals with both Class 1
and Class 2 preferences are sensitive to prices. Individuals with Class 1 preferences,
however, derive statistically significantly greater utility from either the free-range or
the humanely raised product compared to the conventional product. In contrast,
individuals with Class 2 preferences derive statistically significantly less utility from
either the free-range or the humanely raised product than from the conventional
product.
The lower portion of Table 5 reveals that it is somewhat difficult to pin down
a good separation index for these two classes, but if anything Class 2 preferences
are more likely for respondents who have larger households (and potentially
for individuals who view themselves as ideologically more conservative); Class 2
preferences are less likely for people who believe that humane standards will make
more of an improvement in animal welfare (and potentially for people who report
being concerned about antibiotics, growth hormones, or genetic engineering and how
these might affect chicken products).18
While all of the preference coefficients for Class 2 are individually statistically
significant, the implied premiums willingly paid per pound for the free-range or
humanely raised products for this Class are negative. This occurs despite the fact
that the free-range or humanely raised options were never priced lower than the
conventional option, so the best we can do is to interpret these coefficients as implying
a definite zero incremental willingness to pay for the humanely raised product for
this market segment.
18Gender appears to have no discernible effect on class membership; having at least a bachelor’s
degree may reduce the chance of being in Class 2 (in some specifications, for a slightly different
subsample of the data), as may the opinion that the humanely raised product is healthier. However,
inclusion of the “H. (humanely raised product) healthiness” variable causes the coefficient on
the “antibiotic concerns” variable to become even less significant. It is worth noting that these
perceptions (healthiness and antibiotic concerns) are somewhat correlated. These correlations are
discussed in online Appendix C.
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Thus the latent class model seems to be telling us that there is one market
segment that views free-range and humanely raised products favorably and another
that cares nothing for them. Had the separation equation been more precisely
estimated, the latent class model might be something we could pursue. Of course,
there may be other discernible classes in this market if one had sufficient data to be
able to discriminate between them. Given the tenuousness of the separating equation,
however, our preferred specification involves the systematically varying parameters
in Table 3.
Caveats and suggestions for further research
In this study, we chose to elicit from each individual their perceived levels
for several attributes of humanely raised products. For example, we asked whether
they thought that humanely raised standards would improve animal well-being (“H.
improves well-being”). Ideally, one would like to be able to “treat” each respondent
with exogenously defined information about humane standards for farm animals
and to have them completely accept this information. Then it might be possible
to contemplate an exogenous change in this information to derive answers to the
question of “How would WTP change when animal welfare is changed?” We might
have attempted to assert to respondents (rather than eliciting their subjective ratings
about) the extent of animal welfare improvements under certification, the relative
healthiness of humanely raised products versus conventional products, and how
much worry is appropriate concerning antibiotics, growth hormones, and genetic
engineering. These exogenous product design “attributes” could then have been
added to the minimal list of product attributes in the current choice sets. Or, we
could have asked respondents (explicitly) to assume no difference in healthiness, and
no human health effects from consumption of conventional products that are not
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also present in the humanely raised product. However, we know that people tend
to adjust the stated attributes in choice scenarios to reflect their own opinions. The
attributes imputed by individuals, in some cases, are a mix of the stated attribute
and the person’s own opinion on the matter.19
People’s prior opinions about product attributes, for example the extent
to which these proposed standards would improve the well-being of animals, are
subjective. These opinions depend upon the individual’s perceptions of how badly
farm animals are currently treated on the average industrial farm. Many people
devote little or no thought to the quality-of-life of the animals they consume as
food. Similarly, many different peer group opinions and other influences affect
the individual’s subjective assessment of the healthiness of humanely raised meats
relative to conventional meats, as well as the extent to which the individual will
be thinking about antibiotics, growth hormones, or genetic engineering, and how
these might affect chicken products. These key attitudinal variables may need to
be considered to be jointly endogenous with the individual’s willingness to pay a
premium for either free-range or humanely raised products.
The main implication of endogeneity in these attitudinal variables is that
we must exercise caution in simulating how WTP is likely to differ when attitudes
differ. If unobserved heterogeneity (not controlled for by our observable respondent
characteristics) affects all three attitudinal variables and WTP, it is technically not
possible to change one attitudinal variable independently from all the rest to assess
its impact upon WTP, even if the three different attitude measures make individually
statistically significant contributions to the explanation of choices.
19Respondents’ modifications of stated probabilities is addressed in Burghart et al. (2007) and
“scenario adjustment” is investigated in Cameron et al. (2009)
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One of our final caveats involves the generalizability of our results. The
sociodemographic cross-section of our sample is fairly representative of the state
and nation as a whole, with the exception of race. Less than 5% of our sample
specifically reports themselves to be nonwhite, which is substantially lower than
the national average of 23%. This lack of racial heterogeneity limits how much we
can generalize our results to other areas of the country that contain more racial
heterogeneity than for the county used for our sample.
To further refine a survey like ours, it would be important to explore ways to
gain better experimental control with respect to individuals’ subjective perceptions
of current animal welfare. It would also be helpful to determine whether there is some
way to distinguish between WTP for improved animal welfare itself and WTP simply
for more reliable guarantees that claims of humanely raised products are accurate.
It may also be possible to exercise additional creativity with respect to the problem
of isolating selfish considerations behind a WTP premium, versus exclusively “other-
regarding” preferences with respect to non-human species.
Conclusions
It is often considered somewhat futile to attempt to disaggregate total
willingness to pay for an environmental asset when total WTP is comprised of use
demand, option demand, bequest demand and existence demand. For example, WTP
to protect members of an endangered species from jeopardy probably involves more
nuances of environmental value than just the well-being of the individual animal. In
this paper, therefore, we have sought to identify a WTP measure for other-species
morbidity reductions that is distinct from other reasons for people’s WTP. We argue
that it may be possible to identify WTP simply to reduce other-species morbidity if
there is a premium for humane treatment of animals even in the context of a common
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and ubiquitous “food animal.” Animals that we eat have no particular symbolic value,
as would be the case for the spotted owl as a barometer of the health of old-growth
forest, for example. Likewise, they cannot be classed as “charismatic megafauna,” as
would be the case for a recently de-listed endangered species like the brown pelican.
For people who consume an animal as food, it is hard to argue that they hold
much value for preventing mortality, although vegetarian and vegan consumers may
have positive values associated with reduced mortality for these species. If we want
to isolate a component of WTP that pertains solely to the well-being of the animal
itself, we need a context that is not confounded by symbolic values or endangered
species status. We need this information because many of the species which are
harmed in an environmental accident (such as the birds that are often affected by a
coastal oil spill, for example) are neither endangered nor charismatic species. These
relatively anonymous, non-symbolic wild birds sometimes suffer and die in the tens or
hundreds of thousands, and it is important to know something about likely patterns
in the public’s willing to pay (in advance) to protect these birds. We have thus
sought evidence of people’s willingness to pay to reduce harm to the quality of life of
other species in a context that is largely divorced from any moral outrage over the
source of this harm.
It is worth mentioning that an increase in the well-being of a specific animal,
in the context examined in this paper, may be viewed as an essentially private good.
At the point of each purchase, the consumer can choose whether to pay a premium
for improvements in one animal’s well-being, with certainty. This is in contrast to
the case of a referendum on a public policy that would mandate increased protection
(reduced risks) for many non-specifically identified individual birds and animals, the
cost of which everyone pays.
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Our research suggests that, on average for our sample, people are willing to
pay perhaps on the order of about $0.35/lb more for chicken breasts from humanely
raised chicken than for conventionally raised chicken, conditional on the assumption
(1) that the humanely raised product is no more or less healthy for humans and (2)
that people have only moderate levels of concern about antibiotics, growth hormones,
and genetic engineering. It is tempting to try to scale the per-pound premium
to predict the premium willingly paid for an entire humanely raised chicken, and
then to contemplate whether this WTP can be further transferred to each seagull
or sandpiper that is harmed by a coastal oil spill, for example. However, this
type of extrapolation is probably inappropriate. We have estimated people’s WTP
for one physical part of a single identifiable chicken, with certainty. Namely, the
particular chicken that the individual is buying on this shopping trip. At most, this
same premium might apply to all packages of chicken breasts purchased over the
year. However, we have strong suggestive evidence (based on the negative effects of
household size, even if we control for income) that the WTP premium is likely to
be declining in the number of chickens, per unit time, that are protected by humane
standards as a result of the consumer’s choices.
While we are not yet able to scale the WTP premia derived in this study to the
problem of valuing reductions in other-species morbidity as a purely public good, our
results are unambiguous that certain segments of the population are willing to give
up other goods and services to improve the well-being of other species. These benefits
from reduced other-species morbidity are in addition to benefits from avoided other-
species mortality. In terms of a “benefits transfer” to the case of oil-related harm to
wildlife in the event of a major oil spill, morbidity-risk values like these would apply
to injured birds which survive, and to dying birds between the time they have been
oiled and the time they succumb.
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Most previous research has focused only upon mortality losses for wildlife,
without attempting to value harm to non-human species from non-fatal morbidity or
stresses caused by harm to their habitat or disruption of their natural habits. Our
research represents a beginning effort to benchmark a disembodied estimate of an
average value for morbidity reductions among other species that is independent of
the cause of this harm.
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CHAPTER III
PAYMENT VEHICLES FOR PUBLIC GOODS: EVIDENCE FROM
CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS
Introduction
State park funding mechanisms across the United States have been shifting
away from public funding and toward user-based fees for the past 20 years.1 State
parks represent a good that is publicly provided, yet rival when congested.2 Economic
theory suggests that without some public funding, state parks would be under-
provided. Theory also suggests that without some marginal cost to users, state
parks may become congested. State governments spend billions of public dollars
annually to maintain these parks for public use, but the shift away from public
funding has left many state parks around the country with substantial maintenance
and operating budget deficits. As a result, state parks have seen decreased access,
diminished services, and in some cases they have been forced to close.
The state park system of California has been significantly impacted by declines
in public funding, the trend toward user fees, and the current recession. Funding has
deteriorated to the point that deferred maintenance in CA state parks is estimated
to be in excess of $1 billion. User fees and concession revenues have served as
increasingly important sources of revenue for state parks in California, but per capita
public expenditures have declined by 33% in the last 10 years. Together, these two
1One example of a user-based fee system is the Northwest Forest Pass (NWFP) program, under
which users purchase an annual pass for unlimited admission to publicly maintained areas in the
Pacific Northwest.
2A good is rival if one person’s use of the good prevents another person from using the same
good.
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sources of revenue comprised over half of the state park department’s overall revenue
stream in the 2010-2011 fiscal year.3
As a result of these funding difficulties, the State Parks and Wildlife
Conservation Trust Fund Act appeared as Prop21 on California’s November 2010
ballot. In this citizens’ initiative, voters were asked to authorize an $18 per year
increase in non-commercial vehicle license fees to place $250 million per year in a
dedicated fund for California’s state parks.4 In exchange for these fixed fees assessed
on every vehicle-owning household, non-commercial vehicles registered in the state
would no longer have to pay a marginal user fee to enter, or park at, state parks and
beaches. Fewer than 43 percent of voters approved of the proposed shift in funding,
however, so Prop 21 failed. As a consequence, 25 percent of California’s 278 state
parks are scheduled to close by July 2012.5
The histogram in Figure 1 shows the size distribution, aggregated to the
level of roughly 7000 Census tracts, of the proportion of affirmative votes for Prop
21. A detailed Appendix accompanies this paper, and the corresponding spatial
distribution of voting proportions can be found in Appendix Figure A.6. Together,
the size and spatial distributions demonstrate the extent of heterogeneity in voter
support for Prop 21 across the state. We explore this heterogeneity—along with
the vast differences across California in income levels, sociodemographics, political
ideologies, park salience, and the availability of substitutes for state parks—to build
3Some statistics concerning the recent history of park funding are summarized in the online
Appendix to accompany this paper. See Appendix Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3.
4Gross revenues from the proposition were expected to be $500 million. The net figure accounts
for the money that would have gone back to the general fund and lost user fee revenue.
5The map in Appendix Figure A.4 shows the locations of the individual state parks within
twelve regions of California; Appendix Figure A.5 shows the locations of the 70 parks which are
currently scheduled to close. The choice of which parks to close was made based on the following
criteria: (1) protect the most significant natural and cultural resources, (2) maintain public access
and revenue generation to the greatest extent possible, and (3) protect closed parks so that they
remain attractive and usable for potential partners.
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a statistical model to explain voting outcomes for Prop 21. Our primary research
objective is to identify which factors best explain variation across Census tracts in
the apparent demand for state parks as public goods. Second-order questions include
the following: (1) Might there have been a lower statewide vehicle license surcharge
at which Prop 21 would have passed? (2) How different would other economic and
sociodemographic conditions need to have been, for Prop 21 to have passed? (3) Does
our model for California’s vote have the potential to predict the likely popularity of
a similar funding changes in other areas of the country?
These questions motivate our research. After spatially aggregating or
disaggregating the relevant data to the common spatial unit of Census tract,
we construct a data set of Prop 21 voting results and other economic and
sociodemographic characteristics. In particular, we construct variables that measure
the gross price of Prop 21 to households, household income, proxies for environmental
preferences, trust in government fiscal responsibility, the availability of substitutes,
and the likely salience of state parks to voters in each tract. Using these variables,
we characterize demand for the provision of state parks as public goods.
We also counterfactually simulate the extent to which California conditions,
and/or the preferences of Californians, would need to have differed for the Prop 21
to have passed, ceteris paribus. We find that demand for Prop 21 is sufficiently
insensitive to the gross price that there is no lower statewide vehicle license fee at
which it would have passed, although there exists considerable heterogeneity, at the
tract level, in the size of the license fee that would have produced a predicted 50-50
vote. We also show the extent to which more-liberal political preferences and greater
sympathies for the environment might have led to a state-wide majority in favor of
Prop 21. Finally, we use county-level hold-out samples to demonstrate how well our
empirical model performs in making predictions about out-of-sample areas.
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Several studies examine user responses to aspects of park management policies
(see Mansfield et al. (2008); Kerkvliet and Nowell (2000); Loomis and Keske (2009);
Crompton and Lue (1992)). There is also a body of work using stated preference
methods to examine how people value public parks, both domestically and in other
countries (see Carson et al. (1994); Shechter et al. (1998); Baral et al. (2008);
Jacobsen and Hanley (2009); Jacobsen and Thorsen (2010)). Some works apply novel
estimation techniques to stated preference data to derive WTP values for protection
of state parks (see Fernandez et al. (2004), Czajkowski and Hanley (2009), Hanley
et al. (2009), Scarpa et al. (2010)), whereas other authors undertake qualitative
studies of attitudes toward park funding (Peters and Hawkins (2009) and Fix and
Vaske (2007)).
This study belongs to the class of literature that uses referendum voting
results to determine demands for public goods. Similar studies in this class include
Deacon and Shapiro (1975), Kline and Wichelns (1994), Kahn and Matsusaka (1997),
Kahn (2002), and Messer et al. (2010), who use U.S. data to characterize support for
environmental referenda. Thalmann (2004), Halbheer et al. (2006), Bornstein and
Thalmann (2008), Bornstein and Lanz (2008), and Schulz and Schlapfer (2009) use
Swiss voting data with similar objectives.
The seminal paper in this literature is Deacon and Shapiro (1975), who model
California voters’ choices on referenda about conservation of the California coastline
and public funding for rapid transit.6 The empirical strategy in this paper is an
adaptation of the model developed by Deacon and Shapiro and is similar to that of
Kahn and Matsusaka (1997), who characterize demand for environmental goods in
general using voting results from all of California’s “environmental” public referenda
6Fischel (1979) uses a separate survey of voters to test different determinants of voting behavior
in a referendum at the local level on a proposed paper and pulp mill in New Hampshire.
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between 1970-1994. They find that environmental goods are normal goods at mean
income levels and become inferior goods at higher income levels, especially when the
environmental good is park land. Interestingly, in contrast to our own findings, they
conclude that little explanatory power is sacrificed by omitting controls for political
ideology as long as other important characteristics of the population are included in
their models.
Kotchen and Powers (2006) use the annual LandVote survey to investigate
how voter support for public acquisition of open space depends upon the proposed
funding mechanism and funding rate. They find that bonds are preferred to taxes
and, in many cases, the difference between financing with a bond or through taxes
determines whether a referendum passes. These findings are consistent with our
results. Finally, Wu and Cutter (2011) innovate in their recent study of voting
on several environmental referenda by disaggregating their data to the level of
the Census block-group and using spatial econometric methods. In their analysis,
allowing for spatial dependence in both the dependent variable and the error term
substantially reduces the magnitude of most coefficients, implying that simple OLS
methods may produce biased estimates. They also conclude that results derived
using county-level data may be subject to aggregation bias, suggesting that such
course aggregation is inappropriate for referendum studies. We use spatial regression
methods as a robustness check of our tract-level results.
Our paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we include
a wider array of economically important explanatory variables than has been used
previously in this literature, paying particular attention to the local availability
of substitutes and state park salience. Second, we test the relative importance
of some of the popular arguments about why Prop 21 failed. Third, given the
substantial heterogeneity in California’s population and geography, we rotate through
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a complete set of county-level hold-out samples to examine our model’s potential
to forecast likely popular support for measures proposing similar changes in park
funding mechanisms for other parts of the country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines a model of
individual voter choice, which motivates the selection of variables for our empirical
specification. Section 3 describes our data. Sections 4 and 5 present our main
estimating specifications and discuss the implications of the fitted models, and
Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual Framework
The raw data consist of individual voters’ choices, aggregated to the precinct
level, which we further aggregate to the tract level. We now present factors that are
part of an individual voter’s decision process on the rationale that these are likely to
be reflected in collective decisions the tract level.
Suppose that voters derive utility from their net income, their number of
park visits, and the perceived equity differences between the status quo and Prop
21. To simplify the model, assume that only one park is relevant to each voter, and
abstract away from the opportunity to buy annual passes for park use. Let Yi be
annual household income for voter i, where i = 1,··· , N indexes all voters. Further,
let xi(Yi, ti, s, q) be park visits per year, where ti is the voter’s full travel cost of
reaching this park (which depends on the distance at which voter i lives from the
park), s is a park’s marginal entry or parking fee, and q is a measure of park quality.
Let k be the proposed surcharge per vehicle and vi be the number of vehicles in the
voter’s household.
Park quality without Prop 21, as a function of total funding and congestion
levels, would be
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q0 = q
{[
G0 + s
(
N∑
i=1
xi(Yi, ti, s, q
0)
)]
,
N∑
i=1
xi(Yi, ti, s, q
0)
}
(III.1)
This equation illustrates two important points. First, overall funding is equal
to current government funding, G0, plus aggregate user fees. As illustrated in
Equation III.1, there is zero additional revenue from the proposed vehicle surcharge
without Prop 21. Second, quality is endogenous because of congestion. The level of
congestion at the park is defined as the aggregate number of trips by all households
i, at the status quo level of park quality, q0
∑
i
xi(Yi, ti, s, q
0), where the utility
maximizing number of trips for each individual depends on park quality. However,
more trips implies greater congestion, which is assumed to decrease quality.
Park quality with Prop 21 would improve to
q1 = q
[(
G1 + k
N∑
i=1
vi
)
,
N∑
i=1
xi(Yi, ti, 0, q
1)
]
(III.2)
where some of the regular government funding G0 would be diverted to other uses
such that G1 < G0. Aggregate revenue from user fees s
(
N∑
i=1
xi(Yi, ti, s, q
0)
)
would
now disappear and be replaced by aggregate revenues from the proposed vehicle
surcharge, k
N∑
i=1
vi. Provided that total funding would increase as a result of Prop
21, we expect quality to improve. However, s = 0 implies a lower visitation cost,
which may also increase congestion and decrease quality. If quality declines, so will
demand, perhaps sufficiently to offset the increase in trips that would otherwise occur
because of lower overall per-trip costs.
Let voters’ utility levels with and without Prop 21 be give by V 1i and V 0i . If
voters perceive different distributional consequences with and without Prop 21, the
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equity consequences of the two funding mechanisms, E1i and E0i will differ.7
V 1i = Ui
[
(Yi − kvi) , xi(Yi, ti, 0, q1), E1i
]
+ η1i
V 0i = Ui
[(
Yi − sxi(Yi, ti, s, q0)
)
, xi(Yi, ti, s, q
0), E0i
]
+ η0i
Substituting Equations (III.1) and (III.2) for q0 and q1 in the above two equations
would allow us to express utility as complex functions of all of the factors discussed
above. The individual can be expected to vote in favor of Prop 21 if expected utility
under Prop 21 is greater than expected utility without Prop 21, or if V 1i − V 0i > 0.8
Most of the discussion in advance of Prop 21 appeared to revolve around the
increase in revenue and therefore the increase in park quality, which would probably
increase park visitation since per trip access costs would be reduced by the amount of
the user fee (although ordinary travel costs would remain). However, the vehicle tax
would reduce net income, so that the fact that park trips would become relatively
cheaper would be offset by the decrease in household net annual income for car-
owning households.
With microeconomic data at the level of individual votes and individual values
for all of the observable determinants of utility, voting decisions could be modeled
using individual discrete choice methods. Unfortunately, this model of individual
voters’ choices is not easily aggregated to provide a corresponding model of the
collective voting behavior by residents of Census tracts. Nevertheless, it highlights
some of the factors that we should attempt to include in any empirical model to
explain the percent of yes votes in each census tract. For example, our available data
7Cai et al. (2010), for example, demonstrate that the perceived distributional consequences of
alternative policies can have a systematic influence on popular support for those policies.
8Since voter pamphlets were silent on the issue, we ignore the complication created by the
endogeneity of congestion levels
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permit us to capture median tract incomes, as well as average household costs of Prop
21 based on average household vehicle holdings. Travel costs can be partially proxied
by distance to the nearest park. While we cannot observe demand for park visits
directly, we control for a wide variety of factors that collectively capture systematic
variation in likely park usage across different types of populations. We also introduce
ratings data for municipal and school bonds – in part because they may serve as a
proxy for voter confidence that governments will not be tempted to divert existing
park spending to other programs, which would negate some of the expected benefits
resulting from the vehicle surcharge.
Many of the other variables in the estimating specification are included to
account for heterogeneity in the marginal utility of net income, which we expect
to depend upon income levels. We include additional variables to account for
heterogeneity in the marginal utility from park visits, which we expect to depend
upon tastes in recreation and upon the number of locally available good substitutes
for state parks.
The underlying voter choice model also suggests that it may be valuable to
control for existing levels of congestion at the parks nearest each voter or census
tract. Unfortunately, uniform statewide historical visitation data for California’s
State Parks appears to be limited. To the extent that congestion will affect perceived
park quality, and if voters were worried about congestion increasing even further at
their favorite parks, we expect to see fewer yes votes for Prop 21.
Data
To conduct our analysis, we have gathered data from several different sources.
Precinct-level voting results for all of the ballot measures and the gubernatorial
candidates for the November 2010 election in California are drawn from the Statewide
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Database (SWDB) maintained by University of California, Berkeley.9 The SWDB
also contains gubernatorial election results, which we used to proxy for political
preferences. We purchased proprietary vehicle registration data from Polk, Inc. to
construct our variable for gross price per household and one proxy for environmental
preferences.10 We also collected school-district and municipal-level bond ratings data
from the California Department of the Treasury to proxy for trust in government
fiscal responsibility. Five-year (2005-2009) average sociodemographic characteristics
at the Census tract level come from the American Community Survey (ACS) of the
U.S. Census Bureau and are used to account for the age distribution, racial and
ethnic composition, occupational and industry mix, and types of households.11 As a
measure of park salience, we gathered hunting and fishing license information from
the Department of Fish and Game. Finally, we use Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) methods to construct measures of state park salience and substitutes, and to
normalize all data on the common spatial unit of Census tracts.
The voting data for Prop 21 are available at the precinct level, but since few
other variables are available at that spatial level, we use ArcGIS to aggregate voting
data to the Census tract level, based on the spatial overlap between Census tracts
and voting precincts. Other explanatory variables were available only the level of
zip codes, municipalities, school districts, or Congressional districts. Implicit in all
aggregation or disaggregation is the assumption that the distributions of different
variables are approximately uniform within their respective spatial extents.
Of the 7049 Census tracts in California, occasional missing data results in
6795 tracts being included in out final estimating data set. Table 6 shows descriptive
9http://swdb.berkeley.edu/
10https://www.polk.com/
11http://www.census.gov/acs/www/
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statistics broken out by category of variable. Average tract-level support for Prop
21 was 43%, with some tracts showing as little as 9% support and others supporting
the proposed change with nearly 85% of the vote. The average gross price in
terms of household vehicle fees was $43.60 and the average of median household
incomes across tracts was $65,212. Statewide, there was much more support for
the Democratic gubernatorial candidate (Jerry Brown) than for the Republican
gubernatorial candidate (Meg Whitman). Across tracts, the average gubernatorial
vote share for the Democratic candidate was 57.6%, while the average share was
36.8% for the Republican candidate. The average distance to a state park from the
centroid of a tract is 7.2 miles, although some tracts are as far as 90 miles from their
closest state park. Finally, the average number of local parks within a 20 km radius
of a Census tract is 120, while some Census tracts are near no local parks and some
have as many as 450 in that same radius.
For October, 2010, we purchased registration data for over seven million
make/model/year combinations in California at the zip code level from Polk, Inc.
We use these data to construct our census-tract average gross price per household
variable.12 We argue that the total cost to each household is more likely to have
affected voting decisions than the cost to individuals within a household. Therefore,
the average number of vehicles per household in each Census tract, times $18,
represents the gross price implied by the proposition. Variation in gross price,
shown in Figure 2, is identified entirely by the heterogeneity in vehicles-per-household
across Census tracts. Zip codes are slightly larger than Census tracts, so we assume
12https://www.polk.com/
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that vehicle holdings are uniformly distributed within zip codes to permit us to
disaggregate this information to the Census tract level.13
We proxied for environmental preferences with several different variables.
To determine which variables to use, we turn to the literature. Using each
community’s share of Green Party registered voters as a proxy for its degree of
environmentalism, Kahn (2007) finds that environmentalists are more likely to
commute by public transit, to purchase hybrid vehicles, and to consume less gasoline
than non-environmentalists. Kahn and Vaughn (2009) find that hybrid vehicles and
LEED-registered buildings tend to cluster in environmentalist communities, where
such communities are defined by a factor analysis across political party registrations
and voting on binding statewide environmental initiatives. Our first environmental
preference variable is the proportion of hybrids per total vehicles in a tract. We
also consider the explanatory power of the proportions of pickup trucks and SUVs
in each tract. It is possible that pickup trucks are a mix of work and recreational
vehicles, but that SUVs reflect vehicles purchased primarily for recreational purposes.
Finally, we collect data from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) to capture
the environmental voting patterns for an area’s legislators.14
Park salience is likely to be an important determinant of demand as well.
Deacon and Schlapfer (2010) find that voter support is related to the distance at
which environmental improvements are likely to occur. We suspect that the distance
to a state park is correlated with demand for state park visits because the closer
an individual lives to a state park, the lower will be the travel cost to access that
13We dropped several Census tracts characterized by relatively few households and very large
numbers of vehicles, leading to implausibly large average numbers of vehicles per household in
some cases. Polk Inc. confirmed that vehicles housed at new and used car lots are included among
the registered vehicles in a zip code.
14Appendix Figure A.8 shows the distribution of the proportion of hybrids across Census tracts.
We obtain LCV scores for California from www.lcv.org.
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park. Using the intuition of the travel cost model, we expect that lower benefits are
approximately equivalent to those benefits being farther away. In addition, due to
locational sorting, voters’ outdoor preferences are likely to be somewhat correlated
with proximity to state parks. Finally, we expect some overlap between park
salience and participation in ecosystem-based activities such as hunting and fishing.
California’s Department of Fish and Game (DFG) began partial implementation of
its electronic hunting and fishing license system during the summer of 2010. We use
license data from the Automated License Data System (ALDS) for November 2010-
October 2011, which is the first complete annual cycle for these digitized data.
Arora and Cason (1999) find that proxies for the tendency of communities to
engage in political action seem to have a greater influence on environmental outcomes
in non-urban areas. We use the physical area of a Census tract to proxy for the degree
of urbanization. Tracts are designed to keep the population sizes relatively similar
across tracts, so they tend to be larger in rural areas than in urban areas. We expect
the demand for state parks will increase with degree of urbanization since state parks
are more scarce in heavily populated areas.
The demand for state parks is also likely to be related to the availability of
both recreation-related and non-recreation substitute opportunities. To capture the
local spatial density of substitutes, we construct 20 km buffers around the centroid
of each Census tract and identify the number of substitutes of different types within
that buffer. Substitutes include any feature that is designated as a State Park,
State Beach, State Recreation Area, State Wilderness Area, or State Historical
Site. We also identify sites designated as National Park, National Seashore, National
Recreation Area, or National Wilderness. We designate other similar sites managed
at lower levels as “Local”. These include anything falling into the category of Local
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Park, Local Beach, Local Recreation Area, Local Wilderness Area, or Local Historical
Site.
Focus groups convened by The Nature Conservancy identified mistrust of
government fiscal responsibility as one of many reasons given by voters for their
decisions to oppose Prop 21. One reason was that they did not trust the California
state government to make appropriate use of the extra funds that would be collected
by Prop 21. Moreover, Dyck (2010) finds that mistrust of government is a consistently
robust predictor of conservative policy choices. Unfortunately, any measure of
the California state government’s level of fiscal responsibility is constant across all
jurisdictions. To build a proxy indicator for government fiscal responsibility that
varies across Census tracts, we argue that trust in a local government’s ability
to manage its finances responsibly, as measured by municipal and school district
bond ratings, may affect voters’ propensities to vote for a proposition that gives the
government more tax revenue.
We obtained data on municipal and school district bond ratings from the office
of the California Department of the Treasury.15 These data contain all bonds issued
in California during 2010 by elementary school districts, high school districts, and
unified school districts, as well as those issued by other types of municipal entities.
The bonds include ratings from at least one, if not more, of the three standard
municipal bond rating agencies.16 Using these data, we construct a measure of trust
in government across Census tracts. To create a measure the quantity and quality of
debt associated with a tract, we identify the municipal and school bonds associated
with jurisdictions that overlap each Census tract, and we calculate the proportion
of debt that is highly rated versus that which is rated less highly. Tracts contain
15http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/debtdata/excel.asp; http://www.californiacityfinance.com/
16Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch
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entities with different levels and risks of debt, so we have variation in levels of this
indicator across tracts.17 We expect that lower-rated municipal or school bonds in a
Census tract will be associated with a lower percentage of yes votes for Proposition
21, which would be consistent with a mistrust of government. Alternatively, lower-
rated bonds could merely signal that people view their community’s condition as
dire, so that any optional expenditure should perhaps be devoted to schools or local
public goods, rather than state parks. The Appendix contains further details about
how this variable was constructed.
Finally, we obtain income and other sociodemographic information from the
American Community Survey (ACS), which provides five-year (2005-2009) averages
of sociodemographic characteristics at the Census tract level. These data give us
measures of over 300 sociodemographic characteristics of interest, including the
income distribution and median household income variables mentioned above—
necessary for any sensible demand model. In our model, we also control for
occupations, industries, the age distribution, race/ethnicity, and some particular
types of household structures (i.e. single moms).
Econometric Specification
General approach
We estimate a log-odds regression model to characterize the demand for Prop
21. The dependent variable in the model is
17It is difficult to be confident about more than just a “high” versus a “not high” overall rating
across up to three rating agencies. The agencies all have comparable definitions for long term
ratings, so a numerical crosswalk was relatively straightforward to establish. With exception of a
very few bonds, all fell within the “investment grade” range for all rating agencies that rated them.
We decided not to use short term ratings because there is not much variation in them, and the are
consequently not very informative. Moreover, trust develops over time, so long term ratings are
likely more reflective of voters’ views of government fiscal acumen than short term ratings.
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logoddsi = ln
(
Yi
1− Yi
)
(III.3)
where Yi is the proportion of yes votes cast in tract i for Prop 21. The log odds ratio
is common in this literature—see Deacon and Shapiro (1975); Kotchen and Powers
(2006); Kahn and Matsusaka (1997); Wu and Cutter (2011); Kline and Wichelns
(1994)—because this transforamtion allows the dependent variable to span the entire
real line instead of being bounded between zero and one.
The equation we estimate for the full set of California data takes the general
form:
logoddsi = β0 + (β
′
1Politi)Pricei + (β
′
2Politi)Incomei + β
′
3Politi
+ β′4EnvPrefi + β
′
5Saliencei + β
′
6Substi + β
′
7Fiscali(III.4)
+ β′8Socioi + β
′
9Econi + β
′
10Ecoli + i
where Pricei is $18×
(
vehiclesi
hhldi
)
, or the average gross price of Prop 21 per household
in tract i ; Incomei is the logged value of median household income (where income
is denominated in $1000 units);
Politi is a vector of variables indicating the approximate proportion of the
Census tract voting for the gubernatorial candidate of each of the parties running in
the 2010 election. (The Democratic Party candidate’s share is designated as the base
share, since the Democratic candidate won. The other left-leaning candidates were
from the Green Party and the Peace and Freedom Party. The candidates from right-
leaning groups were Republican, Libertarian, and from the American Independent
Party.) EnvPrefi is a vector of variables that includes hybrids as a share of vehicles
and other vehicle-related variables, as well as LCV scores during the 2010 Congress;
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Saliencei is a vector of state-park-specific variables including distance to, and
size of, the nearest state park as well as the approximate number of fishing and/or
hunting licenses purchased by residents of a tract; Substi is a vector of counts of
features which may be substitutes for state parks, located within a 20 km radius
of the centroid of the tract; Fiscali is an indicator for the presence of low-rated
municipal or school district bonds in a jurisdiction containing the tract; Socioi is a
vector of sociodemographic controls, including income brackets, age, ethnicity, and
family structure; Econi is a vector of variables to capture local economic conditions,
including median house values and a measure of current foreclosure risk; Ecoli is
a vector of ecological zones within the state of California; and i is a randomly
distributed error term.
Equation (III.4) has microfoundations (Deacon and Shapiro (1975)).
However, the data used in this study are aggregate; in particular, they are group
averages of a binary variable. While Freedman (1999) warns against committing
the “ecological fallacy,” where researchers use relationships derived from group data
to make predictions about individual behavior, Coan and Holman (2008) find that
aggregate results are “robust to ecological problems.” Similarly, Kotchen and Powers
(2006) use aggregate data to make inferences about individual voting preferences,
citing Fischel (1979) as sufficient evidence for their interpretation. To avoid the
ecological fallacy, we will be conservative and adopt the usual strategy of simply
making inferences about group behavior, using the census tract as the unit of
observation. We do not claim to be able to recover individual preferences from our
parameter estimates, but any regularities we discover may of course be suggestive of
new “stylized facts” to be considered in future individual-level studies.
The explanatory variables in equation (III.4) help us achieve our main
objective; that is, to characterize the demand for Prop 21 as precisely as possible.
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Pricei and Incomei allow us to assess the responsiveness of demand for Prop 21 as
a function of the gross price of the proposition and income levels, while we proxy for
expected future incomes using Econi. Inclusion of the political ideology variables,
Politi, dramatically increases the fit of our model. EnvPrefi gives us a glimpse
into how environmental preferences shift demand by using vehicle choices (especially
hybrids) as proxies for environmental preferences. Fiscali allows us to measure
how public trust in the fiscal responsibility of governments may have influenced the
demand for Prop 21. We use Parki to determine how the nearest state park’s
characteristics, including size and distance from the census tract in question, affect
demand for Prop 21. Occupi, Industi, V ehAgei, RaceEthi and Familyi
control for the mix of sociodemographic characteristics represented in each tract.
Substi allows us to determine whether demand for state parks is higher when there
are fewer good substitutes nearby. Finally, Ecoli permits us to determine whether
individuals who self-select to live in different types of ecosystems have different
preferences for state park funding mechanisms.
We estimate the model initially using ordinary least squares (OLS) with
standard errors clustered at the level of the 58 different counties in California. Some
other studies have required population-weighted least squares to account for huge
differences in population sizes across their political units. However, the spatial
extent of Census tracts is defined based upon population so that each tract has
roughly between 2000 and 8000 people. Thus we are not particularly concerned
about distorted inferences that could stem from vast disparities in populations across
the groups for which our variables are summed or averaged. As a robustness check,
though, we estimate a population weighted least squares specification to verify that
this confidence is warranted.
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Spatial Regression
We also explore a spatial regression specification to allow for the possibility
of both spatial correlation in the dependent variable and spatial lags in the error
structure. We do this because we cannot exclude the possibility that the proportion
of yes votes in a census tract is systematically correlated with the proportion of
yes votes in neighboring census tracts. Similarly, it is possible that the error terms
may be spatially autocorrelated. We follow Wu and Cutter (2011) in estimating a
SARAR(1,1) specification, which allows both the dependent variable and the error
term to be spatially autoregressive of order 1:
logoddsi = β0 + ρW1(logoddsi) + (β
′
1Politi)Pricei + (β
′
2Politi)Incomei
+ β′3Politi + β
′
4EnvPrefi + β
′
5Saliencei + β
′
6Substi (III.5)
+ β′7Fiscali + β
′
8Socioi + β
′
9Econi + β
′
10Ecoli + ui
(III.6)
where
ui = λW2u(−i) + i
In equation (5), W1 and W2 are inverse-distance weighted matrices; ρ is a coefficient
measuring the magnitude of spatial correlation in the dependent variable; λ is a
coefficient measuring the magnitude of spatial correlation in the error terms.
Results
We report the main results of our econometric estimation in Table 7. We
will discuss the regression models first, and then consider four simulations, based on
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the estimated model, that permit us to answer some of the questions posed in the
introduction. We then assess the robustness of our results to alternative estimators
and specifications.
Our results are based on 6,795 census tracts for which we have complete data.
We focus on a parsimonious model that nevertheless includes all ten categories of
available regressors. However, we will discuss in detail only the most important
classes of explanatory variables. Column 1a of Table 7 displays parameter estimates
and asymptotic t-test statistics for the OLS specification with clustered errors.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to control for common unobserved
county-wide phenomena that may be present in the data. Column 1b gives the
corresponding marginal effects at the means of the data implied by this specification
for those instances where a variable enters with interaction terms. Column 2
shows the same OLS specification with t-test statistics calculated using unclustered
standard errors to facilitate comparison of its inferences against those from the model
in Column 3, where clustered standard errors are not an available option. Column 3
itself displays results based on a SARAR(1,1) specification like that used in Wu and
Cutter (2011), where we allow both the dependent variable and the error term to be
spatially correlated.
OLS estimates
Before examining the effect of price on support for Prop 21, note that the
standard economic notion of price does not apply in this situation. Our price measure
is gross price and not net price. In order to obtain voters’ anticipated net prices,
we would need to be able to measure the total annual user fees for state parks that
households would avoid if Prop 21 passed. We proxy for things that are likely to be
positively correlated with expected state park user fee savings due to Prop 21, but
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we are referring to just the gross price in our discussion of price. With this caveat
in mind, we can consider the effect of gross price on support for Prop 21. As should
be expected, a higher gross price tends to decrease the log-odds of the yes vote. The
marginal effect of gross price, at the means of the data, is negative and strongly
significantly different from zero.
Our next finding is that the marginal effect of income on the log-odds of a yes
vote is also negative, suggesting that the switch to public funding of state parks may
actually be an inferior good at the means of the data. A possible intuitive explanation
is that people who are able to afford a more expensive vacation will take it, rather
than visiting a state park or state beach. This income effect is consistent with
the results of Kahn and Matsusaka, who find that environmental assets, especially
parks, are inferior at higher levels of income. This insight is relevant to the potential
distributional consequences of Prop 21 in the sense that a uniform tax of $18 on all
vehicles would tend to be regressive (except for people without vehicles). However, if
publicly funded state parks are inferior goods, the savings in user fees represented by
Prop 21 could render the overall net cost implications of Prop 21 more progressive
than the status quo, since the change could represent a transfer of wealth from
higher-income households who do not use state parks to lower-income households
who do.
The estimated effects of political ideology are particularly striking. The more
Republican-leaning is a census tract, the less likely are its residents to vote for
Prop 21, ceteris paribus. This is consistent with the findings of Thalmann (2004),
Bornstein and Lanz (2008), Bornstein and Thalmann (2008), and Coan and Holman
(2008), who find that political ideology has substantial power in explaining variation
in support for an environmental proposition. The estimated marginal effects for the
political ideology variables in Column 1b of Table 7 summarize their effects at the
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means of the data. Not surprisingly, a greater share of Green Party gubernatorial
voters in a Census tract is associated with increased support for Prop 21. However,
greater shares of Republican gubernatorial votes, or for the candidates of the other
minor parties, mean less support for Prop 21. A strong presence of minor parties may
indicate a more heavily polarized community, however, which may diminish support
for public goods in general.
We turn next to environmental preferences. The share of hybrid vehicles has
a coefficient which is positive and highly significant across all specifications in Table
7, suggesting that greater environmental preferences are associated with greater odds
that voters in a tract will view Prop 21 favorably. In gathering explanatory variables,
we postulated that perhaps a large share of people who purchase SUVs do so because
they like to carry camping, hunting, or fishing gear into off-road areas, and these
preferences may be associated with a greater demand for state parks. However, the
share of SUVs in a census tract has no statistically significant effect on votes for Prop
21. Perhaps the choice of an SUV conveys option demand for such activities for some
car owners, but these vehicles may be purchased more because of their other amenities
than for actual sport-related uses. As distinct from SUVs, we speculated that pick-up
trucks might be predominantly work-related vehicles, so that a greater proportion
of them would imply less hauling of recreational equipment and perhaps a greater
capacity for payload associated with farming, or with the building or construction
trades. The negative effect on votes for Prop 21 as a function of the share of pickups
is persistent across specifications and may support this hypothesis. Our final measure
of environmental preferences, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) scores, are
statistically insignificant in our OLS models, but significant and negative in our model
with spatial structure. We suspect that there may be too little spatial resolution at
the level of California’s federal electoral districts to permit us to get a clear picture
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of the potential influence of legislator environmental voting patterns on referendum
voting by individuals at the level of the census tract.
We proxy for voters’ trust in the fiscal responsibility of government using an
indicator for the presence of lower-rated municipal or school bonds. When bond
ratings are available for a tract, lower-rated bonds have a negative effect on the
proportion of yes votes for Prop 21. These results become statistically insignificant
when standard errors are clustered, however. An alternative interpretation for bond
ratings is that they may reflect the opportunity cost of Prop 21 in terms of local public
projects that would have to be forgone. If this is the case, the negative coefficient may
suggest that people in jurisdictions with lower-rated bonds may be more concerned
with the need for investment in local public schools or street maintenance than the
provision of state parks.
An important class of explanatory variables, unique to this study, is the
salience of state parks to voters in a tract. The negative and significant coefficient on
distance to the nearest state park suggests that the further is a tract from its closest
state park, the less likely were its residents to vote for Proposition 21. However, if
the nearest state park is larger, the proportion of yes votes is greater. Smaller tracts
(i.e. in more densely populated areas) are more likely to vote for Prop 21. Finally, it
appears that per-capita hunting licenses obtained in a tract are negatively associated
with support for Prop 21. This could be because hunting is also picking up a “lower
income or rural” effect, or it may simply reflect the fact that state parks typically
do not allow hunting. Any land devoted to state parks may be viewed by hunters as
reducing their access to potential hunting areas.
Among areas designated officially as California State Parks, parks and state
beaches comprise the majority of these public lands. It is possible that these various
sites are perceived as substitutes. In our models to explain the vote on Prop 21, there
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is a negative coefficient on the number of state parks within twenty kilometers of
each census tract, but the coefficient on the number of state beaches is unexpectedly
positive. However, an important insight here is that being within twenty kilometers
of a state beach also means that the tract centroid is within twenty kilometers of
the Pacific Ocean, and both property values and incomes tend to be higher near
the coast. State parks that are not beaches tend to be inland and in more rural
areas, where property values and incomes are typically lower. The local density of
state parks, as opposed to state beaches, may thus be picking up a number of other
differences across census tracts in California.
We also include in our models a variety of potential substitutes that are very
different from state parks. The coefficient on museums is positive. Many museums
are located in urban areas, where recreational opportunities may be in relatively
short supply. Another speculative explanation is that people who choose to live in
areas with more museums may be more inclined to want to preserve things for future
generations. Consistent with that explanation, proximity to a greater number of
local parks is also associated with greater support for Prop 21 in the OLS model.
We find a negative coefficient on “attractions,” however, which include things
such as amusement parks. These represent a very different type of substitute for
state parks—much different than other wilderness or natural recreation areas. But
they are substitutes nonetheless.
In contemplating the transferability of our findings to other states, it will
be important to control for the availability of substitutes for state parks. While
many other states do not enjoy California’s endowment of attractive natural areas,
California’s geography is large and highly diverse. The state contains the full
spectrum of development levels and has many less-attractive “natural” areas as well.
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With respect to Census tract age distributions, only the share of 20- to 24-
year-olds in a tract has a statistically significant (and positive) effect on the share
of votes in favor of Prop 21. People in this age group are typically living on their
own, yet are still operating on a relatively tight budget. They are old enough to go
to state parks without adult supervision, still earn little enough to appreciate that
state parks represent a low-budget break or vacation, and they are still fit enough to
walk or hike vigorously.
Of the remaining sociodemographic results, the Hispanic/Latino case may be
the most interesting. At the means of the data, it seems that tracts with higher
membership in this category are less like to support Prop 21. However, as median
tract incomes increase, the effect of a greater share of Hispanics/Latinos is positive,
suggesting that higher-income members of this group make greater use of state parks.
Cronan et al. (2008) provide evidence to suggest that members of this group tend to
enjoy parks as settings for family gatherings in natural surroundings as well as for
physical recreation pursuits. Cronan et al. use the results of a national multiyear and
multisite study by the USDA Forest Service to show that half of the Hispanic/Latino
respondents walked to city park sites, whereas few or none walked to state or regional
park sites. To the extent that higher-income households in this group find it easier
to reach state parks, they are more likely to be state park users.
Spatial estimates
The tiny magnitudes of the statistically significant coefficients on ρ and λ
suggest that the impact of allowing for spatial autocorrelation on our results is
unlikely to be substantial. The only notable result in this alternative specification
concerns the coefficient on the number of local parks within a 20 kilometer buffer. It is
different in sign from the OLS model, suggesting that local parks are complementary
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to state parks. This is in contrast to the OLS specification, which suggests that
local parks are substitutes. Local parks may be more numerous in communities that
display greater demand for public goods in general.
Simulations
We turn now to some of the specific questions we posed at the beginning of
the paper. We answer these questions by simulating counterfactual scenarios under
which (1) the price of Prop 21 is lower, (2) the population is more liberal, (3) the
population is more environmentally conscious, or (4) the population has greater trust
in the government’s ability to handle its finances.
We first solve for the vehicle surcharge that might have led to a break-even
vote in each individual census tract. For each census tract, we use 1000 random
draws from the estimated asymptotically joint normal distribution of the parameters
to produce both a point estimate and a simulated confidence interval for the predicted
break-even vehicle surcharge, ki. Our model predicts that for 55.3 percent of tracts,
even lowering the per-vehicle surcharge all the way to $1 would not be enough to
achieve a fifty percent vote for Prop 21.18 For the other 44.7 percent of tracts,
however, the simulated vehicle surcharges such that predicted yes votes would reach
fifty percent in each tract are depicted across these tracts in Figure 3, which shows
the distribution of point estimates of the tract-level break-even fees. Although there
exists no positive break-even price for 55.3% of the tracts in our sample, some tracts
18The simulation is a linear extrapolation. Evidence of a discontinuous jump in demand at p=$0
exists in the development literature (Cohen and Dupas (2010), for example) and we have no reason
to expect it would be different here.
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appear to have been willing to pay upwards of $150 per vehicle and still collectively
pass Prop 21 at 50%.19
Alternatively, we could ask whether there might have been some lower
common statewide vehicle license surcharge, less than $18, which would have allowed
Prop 21 to just pass. This means that the overall proportion of votes, across all census
tracts, would have to reach 50%. For this simulation, we must have ki = k for all
census tracts. The most efficient way to obtain a point estimate of the “break-even”
vehicle surcharge is simply to conduct a line-search, starting at $18 and reducing the
price incrementally. Using this strategy, we find that even reducing the per-vehicle
surcharge all the way to $1 would still have been insufficient to pass Prop 21.20 Voters
appear to be rather insensitive to the gross price. One explanation is that people
cared more about the payment vehicle for funding Prop 21 than they cared about
the actual cost of funding Prop 21.
This explanation is consistent with the results of Nelson et al. (2007) and
Kotchen and Powers, who find that municipal open-space conservation referenda
are less likely to pass when new taxes are involved. It is also consistent with the
results of Johnson (1999), who finds that potential price increases seem to have
negligible effects on voter support for the proposed regulation. The explanation is
inconsistent, however, with the findings of Halbheer et al. (2006), who determine that
the proportion of yes votes does not seem to depend upon whether a proposal involves
a tax, including cases of environmental taxes as well as public good provision that
will require additional taxes for funding. However, the explanation for this difference
19As Appendix Figure A.9 illustrates, there is also substantial spatial heterogeneity in WTP for
parks across census tracts.
20This is an out-of-sample prediction. In the actual data, the cost to the household of Prop 21
was constant, per vehicle, and we rely on variations in average vehicles per household to pin down
the gross price effect.
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may lie in different attitudes to wards taxes in general in the U.S. versus Switzerland.
Matsusaka (1995) and Matsusaka (2005) find that states with direct democracy, such
as California, rely less on broad-based taxes and more on user fees, lending further
support to the idea that a tax may not have been the proper payment vehicle for the
objective that the framers of Prop 21 had in mind.
We turn now to the other questions we posed at the beginning of the paper.
We do this by simulating counterfactual scenarios in which the population is more
liberal, more environmentally conscious, or has greater trust in the government’s
ability to handle its finances.
Now consider the effect of the share of votes for the Republican gubernatorial
candidate in the same 2010 election. The point estimate suggests that the greater
the share of Republicans in a tract, the lower the share of yes votes for Prop 21.
This effect is very strongly significant. This raises the question: How much more
liberal would tract voting populations need to have been to just pass Prop 21? For
this simulation, we fix the minor party gubernatorial vote shares and concentrate on
the margin between mainstream Democrats and mainstream Republicans (i.e. we
shift only the swing voter between these two parties). To simulate a higher share of
Democrats without any shares exceeding 1.0, we manipulate the log-odds of the share
of Democratic gubernatorial votes among just the Democratic and Republican votes.
We incrementally shift the log-odds of the proportion of Democratic votes across all
census tracts by an equal amount, each time checking the predicted effect on the
statewide vote in favor of Prop 21 (assuming that voter turnout is unaffected). We
iterate until the overall simulated proportion of yes votes for Prop 21, in the state
as a whole, just reaches fifty percent. Figure 4 shows the substantial increase in
the proportion of Democrats (at the expense of Republicans) that would have been
necessary for Prop 21 to pass, holding every other factor constant.
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We also simulate an increase in environmental consciousness by holding all
other factors constant and increasing the proportion of hybrid vehicles in each tract
by a uniform amount across all tracts until the predicted statewide vote just reaches
fifty percent. (This proportion never approaches 1.0 in any tract, so it is unnecessary
to work in terms of the log-odds in this case.) The observed proportion of hybrids
averages 0.00273 across census tracts in our sample. Assuming that voter turnout
would have been no different, our model predicts that if the average share of hybrid
vehicles had been 0.01227 (and had the actual environmental sentiments this share
represents changed accordingly), Prop 21 would have just passed at the statewide
level.
Finally, we simulate full trust in government fiscal responsibility as measured
by bond ratings for municipalities and school districts. For the simulation scenario
in which all municipal and school bonds fall into the “highly rated” category, the
predicted proportion of yes votes across the state would shift only from 0.424 to
0.428. This measure of trust matters statistically, but it makes little difference to
the overall voting outcome on Prop 21.
Hold-out Samples and Out-of-Sample Predictions
As mentioned in the introduction, an understanding of the determinants of
support for Prop 21 across the different regions of California may provide a tool to
predict likely support for a similar proposition in other direct democracy states, or
popular support for similar legislation in states that do not practice direct democracy.
We thus explore the extent to which our model might succeed in forecasting the vote
for Prop 21 in other jurisdictions. Ideally, we would gather analogous explanatory
variables for Census tracts in other states to judge the predictive ability of our model.
However, no other states have conducted such a vote, so we would have no way to
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assess predictive validity in such a case. Instead, we use hold-out samples of census
tracts from the California data as proxies for other states.
Specifically, we rotate through each of the counties of California, excluding
its constituent Census tracts from the estimation process. We save the estimated
parameters of the model and use them to predict the share of yes votes in each of
the tracts of the hold-out county. To ensure that the variability in the parameter
estimates is reflected in our prediction about the voting outcome for the hold-out
county, we use simulation methods to generate both point and interval estimates
for our predicted overall vote shares in each hold-out county. We make 1000 draws
from the joint distribution of the parameters. For each draw, we calculate fitted vote
shares for every tract, apply these to the observed voter turnout, and then aggregate
yes votes as a share of total votes across the entire county. Across the 1000 parameter
draws, we build up a sampling distribution for the county-level vote share.21
Table 8 summarizes, for each hold-out county, the results of our tests of the
out-of-sample forecasting ability of our model. The mean simulated county-level vote
share in the column labeled “Point” (under “Fitted Share Yes”) is very close to the
actual share of yes votes at the county level for most counties. We also provide the
95 percent interval for each prediction, as implied by the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles
of the simulated distribution of the share of county-level yes votes.
Table 8 demonstrates that, based on point predictions, the simple passage or
failure of Prop 21 is correctly predicted for 55 of the 58 different hold-out counties.
In two of the three cases where the mean prediction is wrong, the interval estimate
for the share of yes votes includes 0.5 so that either outcome was possible. For only
one holdout county (Siskiyou) did our model predict failure unambiguously when
Prop 21 actually passed.
21If voter turnouts were unknown, they might be estimated based on prior elections
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Prop 21 actually passed in eleven of California’s 58 counties. In seven of these
cases, our interval estimate predicted passage unambiguously. In three other cases,
the prediction interval included the possibility of passage. For 52 of the 58 holdout
counties, our 95% interval predictions yield an unambiguous forecast of passage, or an
unambiguous forecast of failure, of Prop 21 (i.e. the simulated 95% interval excludes
0.5). These predictions are correct in 51 of these 52 cases.
Finally, we might wish instead to treat the actual county share of yes votes as
our prediction of interest, rather than just the passage or failure of the Proposition
at the county level. Table 8 shows that the actual point value of the county-level
vote share is captured by the 95 percent prediction interval for 26 of the 58 hold-out
counties. If we expand the prediction interval to 99%, however, the actual county
vote share lies within the prediction interval in 46 of the 58 cases, with these cases
shown simply as check marks in the final column of Table 8.
There is considerable heterogeneity across California counties in our
explanatory variables. To the extent that this heterogeneity also spans the variation
across the U.S. in these same explanatory variables, the degree of prediction success
across hold-out counties within California is encouraging for the likely prediction
success of our California model, were it to be transferred to other states.
Robustness Checks and Falsification Tests
We test for the possibility that our results could be distorted because we are
not accounting for differences in voter turnout or population across Census tracts.
Additionally, one might wonder whether the econometric model in this paper uniquely
explains the variation in the vote for Prop 21 or if may also explain variation in
the votes for other statewide propositions on the November 2010 ballot. It is also
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reasonable to question whether the variables that explain variation in the vote for
Prop 21 may also be explaining voters’ propensities to vote.
As a robustness check, we run a voter-weighted grouped logit and compared
those results to the full model from Table 7. We also test to see if heterogeneity
in population sizes may be influencing our results. By construction, Census tracts
tend to contain between 2000 and 8000 people. Although the variation in population
is not large, we confirm that variation in population is not driving our results by
comparing results from a population-weighted OLS model to our full unweighted
OLS model. These results appear in Appendix Table A.1 and confirm that neither
alternative estimator gives qualitatively different estimates than our preferred OLS
model.
As a falsification test, we compare our fitted model for Prop 21 with
analogous models to explain other referendum voting results from the same
election. Specifically, we consider Prop 22 (The Local Taxpayer, Public Safety,
and Transportation Protection Act) and Prop 26 (Supermajority Vote to Pass New
Taxes and Fees Act). Prop 22 prohibits the state, even during a period of severe
financial hardship, from delaying the distribution of tax revenues for transportation,
redevelopment, or local government projects and services. Prop 26 requires that
certain state fees be approved by two-thirds vote of Legislature and certain local fees
be approved by two-thirds of voters. Both propositions concern how the government
will handle tax revenues, but they arguably have nothing to do with parks or other
environmental public goods.
We estimate specifications identical to Model 1a in Table 7 for these two other
propositions, with the results appearing in Appendix Table A.2. Let the estimates
for Prop 21 be “Group 1” and the estimates for Prop 22 and Prop 26 be “Group 2.” Of
the 76 estimated coefficients, we compare coefficients on the same regressor across the
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two groups and focus on those cases where there is at least one statistically significant
coefficient in each group. For 32 of the 76 coefficients, the signs on the statistically
significant coefficient estimates differed across groups. For 42 other coefficients, the
slopes were statistically insignificant in one or both groups. For only two coefficients
were the signs the same, with at least one significant coefficient in each group. In
both of those cases the sizes of the coefficients differed across groups by an order
of magnitude. Next, we save the residuals for our preferred specification explaining
voter support for Prop 21 and the other specifications explaining variation in support
for Propositions 22 and 26. We obtain pairwise residual correlations between Prop
21 and Prop 22 and between Prop 21 and Prop 26. If our full set of explanatory
variables was explaining the variation in support for Prop 21 vs Prop 22 and Prop
26 equally well, we would expect the residual correlations to be close to 1. Instead,
the correlation between the residuals of Model 1a in Table 7 and the analogous
specification for Prop 22 is just -0.337 and the residual correlation between Prop 21
and Prop 26 is -0.564. We conclude that the data-generating process that led to
voting patterns for Prop 21 is fundamentally different from that which led to voting
patterns on Prop 22 and Prop 26. Notably, none of the coefficients for state park
substitutes are statistically significant for Prop 22 or Prop 26.
Finally, we confirm that our model is not simply explaining voter turnout. If
it was, we would expect that our full set of explanatory variables to explain well the
variation in voter turnout for the same election in which Prop 21 occurred. As an
additional falsification test, we regress the log odds of the proportion voters who voted
on the full set of explanatory variables employed in Table 7. These results appear in
Appendix Table A.3. Of the 76 estimated coefficients, we compare coefficients on the
same regressor across the two regressions and once again focus on those cases where
there is at least one statistically significant coefficient in each group. For 11 of the
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76 coefficients, the signs on the statistically significant coefficient estimates differed
across regressions. For 54 other coefficients, the slopes were statistically insignificant
in one or both regressions. For another 11 coefficients, the signs and significance
were the same. In those cases the sizes of the coefficients differed across groups by an
order of magnitude. Next, we save the residuals for both our preferred specification
explaining voter support for Prop 21 and the voter turnout specification and obtain
the correlation between the residuals. The correlation between the residuals of Model
1a in Table 7 and the analogous specification for voter turnout is just 0.0617, allowing
us to once again conclude that the data-generating process that led to voting patterns
for Prop 21 is different from that which led voters to vote.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to identify which factors were most
important in explaining the substantial variation across California in support for
Prop 21 on the November 2010 ballot. To do this, we construct a rich set of data with
a larger variety of economically motivated explanatory variables than has previously
been used in the literature. Our key explanatory variable is the average number
of vehicles per household, used to determine the average annual gross price of the
proposition to households in each tract. Three main questions motivate our study.
1. Could there have been a single lower statewide vehicle-license surcharge at
which Prop 21 may have passed?
Almost 43 percent of California voters did vote in favor of Prop 21, so it is
reasonable to wonder whether Prop 21 might have passed had the fee been less
than $18 per vehicle. We simulate lower fees per vehicle. The results suggest
that there is no lower statewide fee at which Prop 21 would have passed, all
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other things equal. We also use our model, on a tract by tract basis, to solve
for the highest per-vehicle fee that would have produced 50% support in each
tract. These fitted break-even fees display substantial heterogeneity across
tracts. Although the majority of census tracts in the state would not have
passed Prop 21 at any positive price, our model suggests that, in some tracts,
the proposition would have just passed at per-vehicle fees as high as $50 to
$100.
2. How different would other economic and sociodemographic conditions have
needed to be for Prop 21 to have passed?
(a) More trust in government fiscal responsibility: The coefficient on the
presence of lower-rated municipal or school bonds, which represents our
local proxy for trust in government fiscal responsibility, is statistically
significant and negative in the specification where we allow for spatial
autocorrelation. We suggest a couple explanations for this. First, a
presumably less-favorable view of how responsibly government entities
manage the money they raise corresponds to less support for Prop 21.
Second, voters may have had a greater concern for the financial needs of
local government as opposed to those of state park management at the
time of the vote.
(b) A more liberal electorate: The mix of political ideologies represented in
each census tract has a large influence on the proportion of votes for Prop
21. Our simulations suggest that it would have taken a substantial shift
toward the left by swing voters for Prop 21 to have passed statewide.
(c) Greater environmental sympathies: Stronger preferences for the
environment, as proxied by the proportion of hybrid vehicles in a tract,
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could have pushed Prop 21 to pass at the state level. Our simulations
suggest that environmental preferences consistent with a four-fold greater
share of hybrid vehicle ownership could have passed Prop 21, all else
constant.
3. Could the predictions of our model be used to ascertain the likely success of a
similar voter initiative passing in other areas of the country?
California is a big state with a large amount of geographic, sociodemographic,
and political heterogeneity. Inasmuch as the voters in another state at
a different point in time have characteristics spanned by the conditions
represented across California in November of 2010, it might be possible to use
our model to forecast likely support for a similar measure in those other areas
of the country. While our model does not permit inferences about individual
voting behavior, our covariates explain almost 87 percent of the variation in
support for Prop 21 at the census tract level across California. In addition,
our hold-out sample analysis indicates good in-state predictive ability, which
increases our confidence that the empirical model could be used for predicting
success of a similar measure in another part of the country.
There are, of course, other potential explanations for why Prop 21 failed.
For example, Li et al. (2011) find that people are significantly less likely to
give to government charity organizations than to private charities, and national
organizations attract more donations than do local and state organizations.
Moreover, they find that people are much more willing to be voluntarily taxed when
the public good in question is cancer research as opposed to education, national
parks and wildlife, or disaster relief. It is possible that many people in California
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may have had other demands for charitable contributions on their minds at the time
of the election.
There are many reasons why the nature of state park funding mechanisms is
a socially relevant issue. One is the potential distributional consequences of different
possible funding mechanisms. There exists evidence that Prop 21 was an “inferior”
economic good at the means of the data, implying that tracts with lower median
incomes were actually more likely to vote for the proposition. This could be true if a
prolonged recession causes people to anticipate that they may need to substitute away
from more expensive out-of-state vacations and visit state parks instead. Perhaps
support for Prop 21 was greater than it would otherwise have been, due to the
concurrent recession. In addition, tracts with larger shares of Asian and African-
American populations were less likely to vote in favor of Prop 21, suggesting that
these groups may derive less utility from access to state parks. However, there is
some evidence that Latino/Hispanic populations found Prop 21 more appealing, at
least for higher-income tracts with higher proportions of this group.
Another reason that the mode of state park funding could matter, from
a societal perspective, is congestion control. In addition to raising revenue from
park visitors, user fees were initially implemented in part to manage congestion by
imposing a positive marginal price per visit for park users. Depending upon the price
elasticity of demand for visits to state parks, a per-visit fee could discourage some
types of households from using state parks.
Finally, Siikamaki (2011) finds that the establishment and existence of state
parks generates a substantial amount of nature recreation in the general population,
the annual value of which he estimates at $14 billion. Given the growing obesity
epidemic in the U.S. population, there may be an argument for the potential positive
health-related externalities that could be associated with removing per-trip user fees
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that constitute a disincentive to engage in nature-based outdoor recreation. As state
parks around the country continue to fall into disrepair because of a lack of funding,
this study provides useful information for policy-makers and environmental groups in
other parts of the country as they try to solve their own state park funding problems.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON DRY-CLEANING
FIRM EXITS
Background and Motivation
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 identified perchloroethylene (PCE)
as a hazardous air pollutant (HAP) and therefore subject to regulation. PCE is the
chemical used in the most prominent method of dry cleaning. Detrimental health
effects tend to occur in individuals who spend extended periods of time in close
proximity to elevated levels of PCE, such as workers at, or neighbors of, dry cleaning
facilities. This paper examines a panel data set for all dry-cleaning establishments
in the State of California during 1990 through 2009, with an eye to quantifying
the effects of PCE regulation on this particular industry. The available data begin
at the point when the Clean Air Act Amendments went into effect and they span
two decades during which even more stringent regulations were implemented. The
different timing of similar regulations in two different jurisdictions within California
permit a difference-in-differences approach to identifying the effects of regulation on
a variety of outcome measures in this industry.
The objective of environmental regulations is to improve environmental
quality, but there are usually some economic tradeoffs involved. If this were not the
case, then environmental regulations would be unopposed. Economic theory suggests
that environmental regulations force the market to internalize otherwise external
costs, resulting in fewer units of a good being provided. Overall domestic PCE use
began a fairly sharp decline in the 1990’s, as illustrated in Figure 5. According
to Doherty (2000), the dry cleaning industry was the primary consumer of PCE in
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1980. By 2007, the industry accounted for about 10% of the domestic PCE demand
but accounts for a disproportionate amount of public exposure due to the numbers
and spatial distribution of retail dry-cleaning establishments. (Halogenated Solvents
Industry Alliance (2012)) As a subgroup of entities using PCE, the percent of U.S.
dry cleaners using PCE peaked around 1980 (86.7%) and has been declining ever
since. In 2007, 70% of U.S. dry cleaners still used PCE. In April, 2012, France
banned the use of PCE in dry cleaning facilities.1
Real action to curb PCE use began in 1994 after the EPA released a report
on PCE and its potentially harmful side-effects. That same year, Connecticut and
Florida began the first dry-cleaning solvent cleaning programs in the U.S. and Dade
County, Florida sued several dry cleaners because traces of PCE were found in
groundwater. Meanwhile, California decided the EPA standards were not strict
enough and passed its own laws restricting PCE use late in 1993. It was estimated
that 40% of dry cleaners would need to install new equipment at a total industry
compliance cost of between $60M and $90M.
The next round of regulation came more recently, again courtesy of the Clean
Air Act. We concentrate on regulation of this industry in the State of California.
Under the amended Dry Cleaning Airborne Toxic Control Measure regulations,
no new PCE machines could be installed after December 31, 2007 in the state
of California. In addition, PCE machines were to be eliminated in co-residential
facilities by July 1, 2010, converted machines and machines that are more than
fourteen years old were to be removed from service by July 1, 2010, and all remaining
PCE machines must be removed from service once they become fifteen years old.
This implies that all PCE machines will have to be retired from service by January
1, 2023.
1http://chemicalwatch.com/10853/france-takes-action-on-perchloroethylene-cleaning-chemicals
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The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) is the air
pollution control agency for the urbanized portions of Los Angeles, Riverside and
San Bernardino Counties, plus all of Orange County, in Southern California. Its
coverage area is only 10,743 square miles, but this geographic area is home to more
than 16.8 million people. This is roughly half the population of the entire state.
After New York City, this is the second most densely populated area in the United
States and it is also one of the smoggiest, due to its population, its dependence upon
motor vehicles due to the timing of its period of greatest growth, its industrial base,
and its particular climate and topography. The region has been chronically out of
compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).2
Our research objective to identify the effects of PCE regulation on the dry-
cleaning industry is aided by the fact that the SCAQMD has the authority to impose
more stringent air quality rules than those which prevail elsewhere. In the case of
perchloroethylene, SCAQMD implemented nearly identical rules to those described
above, but did so four years earlier with their Rule 1421. Under this rule, additional
dry cleaning machinery added after January 1, 2003 was required to be non-PCE,
and all PCE-based dry cleaning facilities were required to install “state-of-the-art”
air pollution controls by November 2007.3 This differential timing of essentially the
same increases in regulatory stringency for the SCAQMD area and elsewhere in the
state permits us to observe the industry during the pre-2003 period, when the same
regulations were in force both inside and outside the SCAQMD. Between 2003 and
2007, the regulations within the SCAQMD were more stringent. Then from 2007
onwards, the rest of the state caught up with the SCAQMD regulations.
2Figure 6 shows the SCAQMD coverage area in the context of one of their daily air quality maps.
3One control technology is “dry-to-dry non-vent capture.” These systems have secondary controls
that keep as many PCE fumes as possible from escaping into the atmosphere as fugitive emissions.
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We anticipate that an increase in regulatory stringency has increased costs for
dry-cleaning businesses. Specifically, there are currently three widely used alternative
dry-cleaning technologies to PCE, all of which involve a reasonably large fixed cost
($40,000-$150,000) for conversion (Ong (2012)). We expect the increased cost may
affect a dry-cleaning firm’s decision about whether to stay in business at the current
location, or move (perhaps to a location where regulations are less stringent) or to
shut down and exit the industry. Figure 7 shows trends in dry cleaners’ choices
over time. There appears to have been an upward trend in instances of dry cleaners
exiting the industry during the period. One possible explanation for this trend is the
increased cost associated with operating a dry cleaning firm under the new regime
of regulation. However, it is essential to distinguish between the effects of new
regulations and secular changes in the demand for dry-cleaning services. Over the
time period in question, dress codes for business have shifted and fabric technology
has also changed. Dry-cleaning firms may go out of business because costs increase
due to regulation, or they may go out of business because demand has declined over
time so that a “shake-out” in the industry would have been expected even without
the increase in regulatory stringency. We do not have sufficient data to attempt
an econometric structural model that separately characterizes both the demand and
supply functions for this particular industry, so the specifications we employ are, of
necessity, reduced form models.
Our empirical models focus upon the impact of regulatory changes on the
viability of dry-cleaning businesses, treating each observation as a particular business
in a given year. However, implicit in business closures or relocations are the
consequences of these decisions for the local communities. It is also important to
study the pattern in solvent conversion, closures, and relocation of dry cleaning firms
as a result of PCE environmental regulation because there are potential distributional
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consequences. If dry cleaners are more likely to close (rather than to incur the high
fixed costs of switching solvents) in already disadvantaged areas, this could create
a hardship for employees in jobs where dress or uniform requirements dictate dry
cleaning services. These workers will find it more difficult to maintain professional
wardrobes. However, there is also a benefit to the local community in the form of
reduced emissions of PCE from dry cleaners in the area. Clearly, there are winners
and losers when dry-cleaning establishments close or relocate. The identities of
the affected groups will figure into any assessment of the equity impacts of these
regulations.
Has increased stringency in the regulation of PCE in California made it more
likely that dry cleaning firms go out of business? Of those firms that exit, are they
more likely to be located in lower socioeconomic status or minority neighborhoods?
Given that over 40 percent of dry-cleaning enterprises in California are owned by a
single ethnic group (i.e. Koreans), have there been any notable differences in closure
rates in those instances where there is sufficient information to assign a Korean-
versus non-Korean ownership indicator to each business?
A few earlier studies have examined the effects of the CAA on small business
industries in the SCAQMD. Thomas (2009) examines the relationship between
environmental regulation of chlorinated solvents and economic growth in the metal
finishing industry. He compares employment trends in Southern California with those
in Chicago and Detroit (traditionally prominent metal finishing areas) to suggest
that there were no adverse employment effects of the SCAQMD’s regulation on the
metal finishing industry beginning in 1988. Thomas and Ong (2004) examine the
relationship between environmental regulations and industrial firm location decisions
using the wood household furniture industry in Southern California. Using data from
the Government Accountability Office, the Los Angeles Times, and the Census, they
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find that firm location decisions appear not to have been consistent with minimum
cost theory and that factors such as agglomeration economies also seem to have
influenced firms’ decisions to relocate.
There is also a well-developed body of literature examining the effects of
environmental regulation on both industry and individual firms. Becker (2011) looks
at the spatial heterogeneity of compliance costs. Burton et al. (2011) examine the
effects of environmental regulatory compliance costs on the paper and pulp industry
structure. Fowlie (2009) discusses environmental leakages, while Millimet et al.
(2009) offer a broader review of the environmental regulation literature. Rassier and
Earnhart (2011) look at some of the financial impacts of environmental regulation.
The specific research described here belongs to the nascent literature
exploring the effects of the PCE regulation on the dry cleaning industry. Thomas
(2007) examines how the dry cleaning industry responded to the SCAMQD PCE
regulations by adopting alternative technologies. The author conducted fifteen in-
person interviews and 187 phone interviews of dry cleaners within the SCAQMD’s
jurisdiction to determine their attitudes toward Rule 1421. These interviews
suggest that that while adoption of new technology is occurring, there has been
some resistance. Policy recommendations include increasing financial assistance for
conversion to alternative dry cleaning technologies and increasing education about
the viability of those technologies.
Ong (2012) uses data from SCAQMD to examine the environmental justice
impacts of the PCE phaseout in SCAQMD. He finds that dry cleaners in
neighborhoods with relatively lower incomes and higher concentrations of minorities
are less likely to adopt non-PCE technology. He also found that dry cleaners in the
same neighborhoods were less likely to obtain one of SCAQMD’s grants to assist in
the cost of switching to greener technology. We acquired the same set of data from
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SCAQMD. However, the SCAQMD documents only those firms in its own jurisdiction
that have ever required permits to operate a dry-cleaning establishment that uses
either PCE or hydrocarbon cleaning technologies. Firms that have never used either
of these solvents do not appear in the regulatory database from the SCAQMD.
While SCAQMD permit application dates are recorded, and the SCAQMD data
do indicate whether a particular permit is now inactive, the data fail to record an
essential piece of information: the date upon which the permit became inactive.
Thus the SCAQMD data, alone, do not permit us to reconstruct a retrospective
panel of data for each dry-cleaner that relies on each regulated technology in each
year.4 However, we augment these data with a twenty-year unbalanced panel of all
dry-cleaning establishments in the state of California from 1990 to 2009, from the
National Establishment Time Series. While it is not possible to identify which firms
changed to “green” technology at which time, we can examine patterns in the timing
of firm closures and correlate these decisions with the degree of regulatory stringency
in effect in the relevant jurisdiction at that time.
We contribute to the literature by pooling data from a number of sources to
construct a relatively rich set of data that provides more direct measures for our
variables of interest. To review, we use NETS data used to build a panel data set for
all retail dry-cleaning businesses in California, both inside and outside the SCAQMD
coverage area, from 1990-2009.5 Important explanatory variables include the size of
the firm, measured by sales revenue for each establishment (available in the NETS
4There are many different AQMDs across the state of California. We contacted all of the major
AQMDs and acquired their regulatory data, but there is no standardization and each district
collects different variables. While we had hoped to construct a state-wide database of which firms
used which technology over which time-period, this is unfortunately impossible.
5 Dry cleaners defined as SIC4 code = 7216 and the SCAQMD has regulatory
authority over these businesses if they use either PCE or hydrocarbon solvents. See
http://www.aqmd.gov/aqmd/cities.html.
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data), average income and the ethnic and racial mix of the neighborhood where each
cleaner operates (with annual series interpolated at the census track level from the US
Census and the American Community Survey), and county-level patterns in economic
activity in general, specifically the percentage change since the previous year in the
number of employees, the number of establishments, and first-quarter payroll (from
the County Business Patterns dataset). We also measure some explanatory variables
in a potentially more appropriate way. For example, we use firm-level sales data
instead of number of machines (e.g. as used by Ong (2012)) to measure firm size,
and we can also use numbers of employees. Finally, we exploit the opportunity to
use a difference-in-differences type of identification strategy to estimate the effect of
the regulation on dry-cleaning firm closures because we observe similar regulations
“stepping in” at different points in time within and outside the jurisdiction of the
SCAQMD.
Data
We combine data from several sources. The first set of data comes from the
National Establishment Time Series database, or NETS. The NETS data include
twenty years of historical data on over 340 variables for more than 41.7 million
U.S. establishments from January 1990 to January 2009. We purchased complete
time-series data for all dry-cleaning related SIC/NAICS codes for six states, but
we concentrate here on the data for California, and especially for those areas under
the jurisdiction of the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD).
The second set of data employed is from SCAQMD and contains dry cleaning
permit information for each regulated machine in each firm, retrospectively for the
period of 1957-2011. The third set of data is Census-tract level sociodemographic
characteristics from 1990-2000 obtained from the Neighborhood Change Database
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(NCDB) prepared by Geolytics, Inc. The fourth set of data is five-year (2005-
2009) average of sociodemographic characteristics at the Census tract level from the
American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau. A fifth data set is
the County Business Patterns data (www.census.gov/econ/cbp), which we acquired
for the 58 counties of California, annually from 1989 through 2009. Finally, we
examine data from the California Air Resources Board on ambient concentrations
of perchloroethyene as measured at the eleven California receptors that were in
operation in the urban areas of the state continuously during 1990-2009.6
Description and Manipulation
The NETS database is a compilation of twenty years of Dun and Bradstreet
(D&B) data. A snapshot, reflecting the economic activity of the preceding year,
was taken every January. The database is as close to an annual census of American
business as exists and allows researchers to focus on detailed components of growth in
the U.S. or any geography of interest. Our data provide comprehensive information
about all dry-cleaning establishments in California over 20 years. The observation
level is the DUNS number.7 From these data we obtain information on whether the
firm is in business, has moved (and to where it moved), and firm revenues. Neumark
et al. (2011) use NETS data to examine the differential job creation between large
and small firms in the United States. They conducted several tests of the quality of
the data and found it to be consistent with other publicly available measures.
The second set of data is from the SCAQMD regulatory agency. Records
in the SCAQMD dataset consist of individual machine permit records. Only those
6www.arb.ca.gov/aqd/aqdcd/aqdcddld.htm
7The DUNS number is a nine-digit number, issued by D&B, assigned to each business in the
D&B database.
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machines which use perchloroethylene or hydrocarbon solvents must be regulated,
so any dry cleaner in the NETS database that does not appear in the SCAQMD
database can be inferred to have never used either of these solvents.8 These
SCAQMD records show the dates a dry cleaner applied for and received permits for a
given machine, the particular type of machine being regulated, and perchloroethylene
emissions records for those machines. Unfortunately, these data contain permit
application and issuance dates, as well as a notation if the permit is currently inactive,
but they do not indicate the date when each permit became inactive. This flaw in
these data prevents us from pinning down the exact span of years when each machine
was operating. We know only when it was placed into service, not when it was
taken out of service. However, from the SCAQMD records we obtain information
on all of the regulated types of technologies each firm is currently using (i.e. PCE
or petroleum), and whether the firm has active permits for regulated dry cleaning
technology.
The SCAQMD data also contain owner/manager names, which allows us to
infer whether the firm’s main decision-maker appears to be Korean. We make use
of a comprehensive list of all Korean last names to identify whether firm owners
are likely to be of Korean descent. While this categorization is not conclusive, it is
important because roughly 40% of dry-cleaning firms in California are Korean-owned
and there is an active Korean American Dry Cleaner’s Association that raised strong
objections to the proposed phase-out of PCE in 2002, in spite of growing concerns
about the health effects.9
8We have matched the street addresses in the SCAQMD data to the street addresses in the
NETS data as fully as possible.
9 (http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=02-P13-00045&segmentID=4).
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Data on neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics at the Census tract
level from 1990-2000 were obtained from the Neighborhood Change Database
(NCDB) provided by Geolytics. Information for individual intercensal years between
1991 and 1999 was linearly interpolated using values from 1990 and 2000.10 These
data were spatially normalized by Geolytics to the extent of the 2000 Census tract
level definitions. We also gathered information on the same set of sociodemographic
variables from the more-recent American Community Survey, which provides five-
year (2005-2009) averages at the Census tract level. We associate these averages
with 2007, then use information from the 2000 census to interpolate and extrapolate
approximations to annual counts for the period from 2001-2009 for each census
tract. Thus the interpolated/extrapolated annual data for the sociodemographic
characteristics of each neighborhood are rather crude, but this information would
seem (a priori) to be an important set of controls for our model.
Each observation in the NETS data set was originally a single firm (DUNS
number) with a set of variables describing its history. We manipulated these data to
create an unbalanced panel of firm-year observations spanning the years 1990-2009.
Using latitude and longitude information for each of the individual firms, we spatially
matched each firm with the 2000 Census tract containing it, therefore assigning that
tract’s characteristics as each firm’s “neighborhood” characteristics. Finally, by firm,
we add the unfortunately limited information from SCAQMD records on type of dry
cleaning technology. The SCAQMD information allows us to distinguish only three
types of firms: (a) those that have never been regulated by SCAQMD, (b) those
that are in business in 2011 but no longer regulated as of the date we acquired the
SCAQMD data, and (c) those that are still using PCE in 2011.
10Stata’s “ipolate” command is helpful for this task.
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The data from the County Business Patterns (CBP) files of the U.S. Census
provide us with county-level data on three important variables: number of employees,
number of establishments, and first-quarter payroll. The information is broken
down by NAICS/SIC codes, but censored when there are too few observations in
a particular industry. We have detailed information on each dry-cleaning firm’s
specific sales revenues in each year from the NETS database, so we rely on the
CBP data to control for overall business activity in each county in California over
the twenty years of our sample. Overall business activity is likely to account for
systematic variations in dry cleaning demand, since consumers have the option to
have their clothing cleaned less frequently when budgets are tight. The counts and
totals provided in the CBP data will reflect the size of each county in the state, so
we construct percent changes in each of the three variables as a measure of ”recent
economic trends” in each county that is independent of the absolute magnitude of
each variable in each county.11
Our final data source permits us to take a look at the actual effects of
efforts to reduce perchloroethylene emissions in California. In 1993, the California
Environmental Protection Agency’s Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted the
Airborne Toxic Control Measure for Emissions of Perc from Dry Cleaning Operations
(Dry Cleaning ATCM), which set down the equipment, operations and maintenance,
recordkeeping, and reporting requirments for PCE dry cleaning establishments. In
2003, the Board evaluated the effectiveness of these measures and established that
emissions from dry-cleaning establishments had been reduced by approximately 70
percent, but that more could be done. In 2007, the Dry Cleaning ATCM was
11While we have not yet done so, there are certain sectors of the economy for which activity
might be a better indicator of dry-cleaning demand than others. For example, activity levels in
“Finance and insurance” or “Management of companies and enterprises” might have more bearing
on the demand for dry cleaning than “Forestry, fishing, hunting, and Agriculture Support” or
“Construction”.
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amended to phase out PCE equipment. The CARB maintains a database of air
quality measures over time, collected at 907 different monitoring sites throughout
California. Not all of these monitors measure PCE concentrations, however. Figure
13 depicts the pattern of years over which PCE data have been collected at
31 different monitors. Only eleven of these monitors have collected PCE data
continuously over the period from 1990 to 2009 covered by our analysis. Of these,
five are located in the SCAQMD area (or Ventura, adjacent to the SCAQMD area),
and six are located elsewhere in the state. We examine the time patterns of PCE
concentrations at these eleven receptors to determine the outcomes of PCE regulation
over this time period.
Summary Statistics
Table 9 provides a brief summary of the main variables employed in our
specifications. The full sample consists of 93,920 observations on up to 20 time-series
observations for each of 9,044 different DUNS numbers (owners) of retail dry-cleaning
establishments in the state of California. These are unbalanced panel data. Table
10 summarizes descriptive statistics for those dry cleaners under the jurisdiction of
SCAQMD and Table 11 describes dry cleaner and neighborhood characteristics for
the rest of the state outside of SCAQMD.
As can be seen from Table 9, the average annual sales of dry-cleaners that have
closed, as well as those that have moved, are greater than those which continue at the
same location in any given year. Establishments that exited were located in slightly
poorer neighborhoods, averaging $67,370 in mean household income, as opposed to
the $72,020 mean household income in the neighborhoods of establishments that
have continued to operate in the same location. In addition, there is a slightly
larger proportion of Hispanics and non-whites (Asians and others) in communities
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where dry-cleaners closed as opposed to continuing to operate. Tables 10 and 11
reflect similar differences between closers and non-closers for just SCAQMD and
non-SCAQMD dry cleaning firms.
The data show that nearly 25% of the firms in the stayer group, at least
some time in the past, have carried permits for the use of PCE or hydrocarbon
technologies. This is true for only 18% of movers and 8% of firms that have closed.
Of the firms that have ever carried such permits, 12% of firms that do not move in
the current period are Korean-owned. For movers, only 9% are Korean-owned, and
for firms that close, the Korean-owned proportion is much smaller, at just 3%.
Methods
We seek to explain the effect of the PCE regulation on a dry cleaning firm’s
decision to stay in business at the same location or exit the industry. We model this
decision using a difference in difference strategy with year fixed effects.
We assume that each firm has an underlying latent propensity-to-fail variable
that, if it could be observed and measured, would simply be regressed upon a vector
of explanatory variables in an ordinary least squares framework. Instead, however,
this latent propensity is unobserved. When it is large – interpreted as positive – we
see a business fail. When it is small, the business does not fail. The scale of the
propensity variable is also unobserved, so that the parameters of the latent regression
can be estimated only up to a scale factor. These standardized scale parameters are
used to calculate the fitted probability of a business failure as a function of specified
values of the explanatory variables. Of additional interest are the marginal effects at
the means (MEMs) and/or the average marginal effects (AMEs) of each explanatory
variable on the probability of a business failure.
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Most econometrics textbooks now contain a thorough discussion of the
maximum likelihood estimation of binary outcome discrete choice models.12(For
example, Wooldridge (2002)) We focus on the specification of the index portion
of the model that drives the value of y∗it, which is the latent propensity for firm i to
go out of business in period t (base year = 1990):
y∗it = β0 + β1SCi +
2008∑
t=1991
γtDt +
2008∑
t=1991
δtSCiDt + θ
′
Xit + εit
where SCi is an indicator for the area regulated by the South Coast Air Quality
Management District and Dt is a vector of year indicators that control for annual
differences in the dependent variable between dry cleaning firms in SCAQMD and
those in the rest of the state. Xit is a vector of controls for county business conditions,
including percentage changes from the previous period in overall county employment,
number of establishments in all sectors, and first-quarter payroll, to proxy for
fluctuations in demand for dry-cleaning services. This vector also includes sales
data for the dry-cleaning business in question as well as a set of sociodemographic
characteristics of the census tract in which the dry-cleaning business is located. This
is to control for neighborhood pressure to “go green,” and also for local dependence
on cheap and effective dry-cleaning services. The assumption of logistic-distributed
errors leads to a maximum likelihood binary logit estimation method.
1990 is our base case year, so the latent regression specification outside
SCAQMD is:
y∗it = β0 + θ
′
Xit + εit
12We also plan a three-alternative outcome variable (stay in business at same address, stay in
business but move to a different address, and go out of business). This model is estimated as a
multinomial logit choice model, so for consistency we use the binary logit model for the failure
model, rather than the usual binary probit model.
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Inside SCAQMD, it will be:
y∗it = (β0 + β1) + θ
′
Xit + εit
In each subsequent year, namely 1991 through 2008, the latent regression will
take the following form for counties outside Southern California:
y∗it = (β0 + γt) + θ
′
Xit + εit, t = 1991, ..., 2008
Inside California, the propensity to fail will be given by:
y∗it = (β0 + β1) + (γt + δt) + θ
′
Xit + εit, t = 1991, ..., 2008
13
We use the margins command in Stata to calculate the average marginal effect
of each year inDt and the average marginal effect of a firm being inside or outside the
Southern California counties covered by the South Coast Air Quality Management
District (SCAQMD), captured in our model by the indicator variable SCi. Our plots
show the differential probabilities of business failure, relative to 1990, between firms
inside SCAQMD and the rest of the state. The precise estimates plotted for the rest
of California, by year, are γt for t = 1991, ..., 2008, and (γt + δt) for t = 1991, ..., 2008
in Southern California. If dry-cleaning firm failure rates display common trends
prior to the main regulatory changes in Southern California, we would expect to
find that δt = 0 in these prior years (or, equivalently, that γt = (γt + δt). In years
when failure rates in the two jurisdictions differ, we look to the sign and statistical
13We drop the year 2009 from the estimating sample because we cannot conclude that firms
present in the sample in 2009 do not go out of business before the following year without the
evidence of their presence in the sample in that subsequent year.
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significance of the δt parameter. When the tighter regulations were proposed for the
SCAQMD region, industry advocates complained that the higher costs imposed on
these business would threaten their viability. Our goal is to examine the statistical
evidence to determine whether SCAQMD dry-cleaners went out of business at a
higher rate than in the rest of the state whenever the regulations there were more
stringent than in other areas.
Results
Logit Specifications
Table 12 displays the results for a succession of increasingly general binomial
logit specifications to explain each firm’s decision at the end of each year in the data.
There are two alternatives: to exit or to not exit. Across these 3 models, we start with
just the interactions between the SCAQMD indicator and year fixed effects. Then
we included the percent change in county-wide employment, first quarter payroll,
and number of establishments. We then include firm sales, employment, and average
household income and ethnic and racial mix in the neighborhood. The estimated
coefficient of interest is that on the interaction between year and SCAQMD.
Examining the coefficients on the interaction term between year and whether
the dry cleaning firm is in SCAQMD for 1996 and 2008, we see that there is actually
a lower propensity for dry cleaning firms under the jurisdiction of SCAQMD to
exit. These statistically significant and negative results persist in columns 2 and 3,
where we add controls for county-wide business pattern changes and census tract
level sociodemographic characteristics. A possible explanation for the 2008 result is
that dry cleaning firms in SCAQMD are those left in the market after four years of
stricter regulation. Those remaining firms had longer to adjust to the new technology
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requirement so that when the regulation went into effect for the rest of the state,
remaining firms in SCAQMD were relatively less likely to close. When the regulation
became binding in the rest of the state in 2007, firms in SCAQMD were not affected
as heavily as those in the remainder of the state.
Figure 8 suggests an alternative explanation for the lower propensity of dry
cleaners in SCAQMD to close. We see that sales levels, controlling for emp_nets, and
all the CBP variables and sociodemographics, are systematically higher for facilities
in SCAQMD than elsewhere in CA, except maybe in 2001 and perhaps in 2008. But
not in individual years, just overall. The higher sales in SC may have permitted
those firms to stay in business. Finally, Figure 9 shows that dry cleaners owned by
Koreans are, as a group, systematically less likely to close. Since nearly half of all dry
cleaners within SCAQMD are Korean owned, this is another possible explanation for
why they are less likely to close. (Thomas (2007))
We have determined that failure rates for dry-cleaning businesses in California
during the period from 1991 to 2009 have tended to exceed the 1990 rate in all
subsequent years except perhaps in 1994, and possibly in 2008, for establishments in
the SCAQMD area. Figure 10 shows that controlling for (a) facility sales and number
of employees, (b) county-level business conditions, and (c) the neighborhood income
and sociodemographic mix around the establishment, failure rates for dry-cleaning
businesses in the SCAQMD region have actually been lower than those in the rest of
California in every year except 1991. Failure rates in all jurisdictions declined until
1994, when new national requirements for PCE were announced, whereupon failure
rates increased sharply over the next couple of years and remained fairly high until
2000-2001, when they appeared to decline until 2003. Then failure rates rose in
both SCAQMD and non-SCAQMD areas until 2005 and then dropped noticeably in
2006. At the end of our sample, in 2008, the first year of the recession, failure rates
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appear to begin to rise in the rest of California, while they continue to decline in the
SCAQMD area. The lower failure rates in the SCAQMD area are not explained by
the higher levels of demand in those areas, since we control for sales and county-level
employment, establishments, and first-quarter payroll.
Table 13 shows results from a binomial logit model for which we define a
variable treated. It takes on a value of 1 for years 2003 and later in SCAQMD and
for years 2007 and later in the rest of the state outside SCAQMD, and a value of
zero otherwise. The first column shows that, on average, firms are less likely to exit
if they are being regulated and if they are inside SCAQMD. The second column
controls for county level macroeconomic conditions. We see no substantive change
in the differential effect of being regulated between those dry cleaners in SCAQMD
and those outside of it. The final column explores further the environmental justice
angle. Firms in neighborhoods with a higher proportion of blacks inside SCAQMD
are more likely to exit, but the effect is smaller than for those dry cleaners not in
SCAQMD. On the other hand, dry cleaners located in neighborhood with a higher
proportion of Asian and other races are also more likely to exit, and this time the
effect is larger for dry cleaners inside SCAQMD than in the rest of California.
Thus we have uncovered little evidence that dry-cleaning businesses in
Southern California suffered more than similar businesses in the rest of the state
as a consequence of the more stringent regulation they faced during 2003-2007. The
flip side of the coin is whether regulation of PCE was less effective in the SCAQMD
are than elsewhere in the State over these time periods. The next section addresses
that question.
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What has happened to ambient PCE levels in California?
Using data for the eleven air quality monitors in California that have
continuously recorded PCE concentrations annually since 1990, we can plot the time
profiles of average PCE concentrations at each monitor. Within a rough scatter of
points that depict the longitude and latitude for every official air quality monitor
over this time period in California, Figure 12 shows the relative distribution of those
monitors that can provide a continuous time-series of PCE measures. We have
grouped the annual data for these eleven monitors into “SCAQMD plus Ventura”
and “Other non-SCAQMD” monitors and show the decline in PCE levels over these
two decades in Figures 14 and 15. Clearly, there have been substantial reductions
in PCE over time at all monitors, although levels are considerably higher in the
SCAQMD region. There are just a couple of anomalous points in these data.
We pool all of the data for these eleven monitors over twenty years in a panel
dataset and use regression method to summarize the time-trend in concentrations
of PCE and the differential between the SCAQMD region and the other monitors.
Regression results for the logarithms of the average, median, 90th percentiles and
75th percentiles of the distribution of PCE levels during the year, at each monitor,
are shown in Table 14. These regressions confirm that PCE levels started at a
significantly higher level in the SCAQMD area than elsewhere. They have been
declining over the period in question, and at two to three percent more per year in
the SCAQMD than elsewhere in California. The results are almost identical if we
allow for monitor-level fixed effects.
Dry-cleaners are not the sole users of PCE, so the change in total levels of
PCE do not confirm that dry-cleaners have reduced their emissions of PCE by this
percentage overall or by a greater percentage than dry-cleaners elsewhere. However,
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there is no evidence to suggest that the somewhat lower failure rate for dry-cleaners
in the SCAQMD area has led to higher levels of fugitive PCE emissions in that region.
According to Figure 8, nominal sales of dry-cleaning establishments in the SCAQMD
area in 2001 dipped towards those in the rest of the state, after controlling for number
of employees, neighborhood incomes and sociodemographic characteristics as well as
county-level economic conditions (total employees, total establishments, and first-
quarter profits). In all other years since 1990, nominal sales for the SCAQMD region
have been higher than elsewhere, although the differences in individual years are not
statistically significant.
What might account for the greater survival rates of dry-cleaners in the
SCAQMD area, despite the more stringent regulations there during 2003-2007? We
do not have comprehensive data on take-up rates for subsidies for the replacement
of equipment with green technologies. It could be the case that these take-up rates
in the SCAQMD area were high enough to prevent business failures that would
otherwise have occurred.
A final consideration is whether dry-cleaners go out of business only to be
replaced by other similar businesses at the same location. In this paper, we have
treated the panel as a set of unique DUNS numbers followed over time. We could
alternatively have defined the unit of observation as a set of addresses over time,
where there is an observation for every address ever appearing in the NETS dataset
and an indicator for whether there is a dry-cleaning establishment operating at that
site in each year. Figure 11 shows a plot of the simple count of total numbers
of dry-cleaning establishments in the SCAQMD area and outside. As can be seen,
there are more total drycleaners serving the SCAQMD area than in all of the rest of
California. For the most part, the time patterns in the counts of establishments in
business in each year (subsuming both births and deaths of establishments) follows
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essentially the same pattern in both jurisdictions. We highlight the years 1994, 2003
and 2007 in these plots.
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to examine some of the possible effects of
the differential PCE regulations over time on the dry cleaning industry within
California. We construct a detailed data set that includes a number of explanatory
variables that have not previously been examined in this literature. Our primary
covariates are the interactions between year fixed effects and an indicator for the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), where tighter regulations
came on line three years sooner than in the rest of the state of California. We
concentrate on factors that have a systematic effect on the propensity for a dry
cleaning establishment to close.
Three questions motivated our study:
1. Has increased stringency in the regulation of PCE in California made it more
likely that dry cleaning firms exit?
Our data do not contain any information on dry-cleaning establishments prior
to 1990, which corresponds to the point when PCE was identified as a toxic
air pollutant in the Clean Air Act Amendments. Thus we cannot establish
the prevailing pattern of dry cleaning business exits prior to the year when it
became apparent that more regulation was forthcoming. However, our data
suggest that exit rates exceeded rates in 1990 in almost every subsequent
year. A few notable exceptions include years leading up to1994 (when
regulations were tightened by the California Air Resource Board), 2003 (when
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the regulations were tightened again), and from 2006 through 2008, although
exit rates exceeded 1990 rates again outside the SCAQMD district by 2008.
If the new regulations had come as a surprise in each of 1994, 2003 and 2007,
one might have expected increases in business exits. However, plenty of notice
was given of the impending changes in rules, and it is possible that firms which
were destined to exit because of the changes in rules actually exited over a
wider span of time leading up to the rule changes, so that few vulnerable firms
were left by the time the rule changes actually took effect. Exits may “lead”
rule changes, rather than coincide with them.
2. Of those firms that exit, are they more likely to be located in lower
socioeconomic status or minority neighborhoods?
The negative sign on the household income variable in our model to explain the
propensity for a dry-cleaning firm to exit tells us that dry cleaning firms are
more likely to exit in neighborhoods which are lower income. The probability
of exit also appears to be greater in non-white neighborhoods. The effect is not
statistically significant in Hispanic areas. The effect of Asian/other ethnicities
is about twice as great as the effect of black populations.
Overall, dry cleaning establishments do not appear to be located disproportionately
in minority neighborhoods compared to the proportions of the population in
the black and Hispanic categories. In California as a whole, the population
recorded in the American Community Survey is roughly 6.1% black, and the
percentage black in the neighborhoods of all dry-cleaners in California over
our full sample is 6.2. In our sample, the average percentage of Hispanics in
the neighborhoods of dry cleaners is about 25%, but the overall proportion of
95
Hispanics in California’s population is now roughly 37%. Thus dry-cleaning
establishments are proportionately under-provided in Hispanic communities,
compared to the overall population. While the proportion of Hispanics in the
SCAQMD proportion of the sample reaches about 30%, the proportions of
Hispanics in Los Angeles, Orange and San Bernardino counties are 47%, 33%
and 48%, respectively. Notably, the overall proportion of persons of Korean
race/ethnicity in California is only 1.2%, although the numbers run as high as
2.8% in Orange County. It is not possible to sort out the Asian ethnicites from
others, given the lack of specificity in the 1990 census designations.
Thus the result that dry-cleaners are more likely to close in areas with
higher proportions of blacks and Asian/other ethnicities is notable. If dry-
cleaning establishments had occurred with greater frequency in neighborhoods
that were more black or more Hispanic in their populations, concerns about
”environmental justice” in terms of exposure to PCE would certainly be raised,
but this does not appear to be the case in our data. Instead, the regulation
of this industry appears to have resulted in a decrease in services to these
communities. It is possible that many of these neighborhoods have been in
transition over time. Dry cleaners in communities with growing demands for
dry-cleaning services might foresee sufficient future profits to justify the large
capital expenditures required for conversion to green cleaning technologies.
Those which did not foresee sufficiently strong future demand might have
decided instead simply to exit. (Current firm sales, however, seem to have
had little independent effect upon exit decisions, so this is merely speculative.)
3. Given that over 40 percent of dry-cleaning enterprises in California are owned
by a single ethnic group (i.e. Koreans), have there been any notable differences
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in exit rates in those instances where there is sufficient information to assign a
Korean- versus non-Korean ownership indicator to each business?
Of those dry-cleaning firms located within SCAQMD, being Korean owned is
associated with a systematically lower propensity of closing.
Finally, using PCE monitor data we find that ambient PCE concentration has
decreased over the past 20 years, and it does not appear that dry cleaners going
out of business is the cause. We are considering possible future extensions, as well.
Some prospective directions for future research include:
1. Make annual requests for SCAQMD data. These data are collected to provide a
snapshot of the current status of all regulated facilities, rather than to facilitate
construction of historical panel data. If we request the data on an annual
basis, we can build true panel data based on these snapshots going forward. In
particular, it will be possible to track the years when specific permits became
inactive–an important piece of information not retained in the SCAQMD’s
current spreadsheets. The PCE rules will become progressively more binding
until 2023, when all PCE-using equipment must be retired.
2. Explore other events for dry-cleaning firms. In this study, we have concentrated
upon firm deaths (exits). There is also some potential to consider the decision
to move (e.g. how many firms moved from inside the SCAQMD regulation
area to outside that area). We also observe that while discontinued DUNS
numbers in dry-cleaning imply that businesses have closed, we also see that
the total number of dry-cleaning establishments in California, both within the
SCAQMD area and outside, have tended to increase over time. The exceptions
have been the period between 1997 and 2000, and perhaps between 2008-2009.
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Thus it may be relevant to consider the determinants of firm births. We could
consider every location where a dry-cleaning firm is eventually observed and
use local neighborhood characteristics and county-level business conditions in
a discrete-time event study of firm births.
3. Consider the vintage of the firm’s technology. Within the jurisdiction of the
SCAQMD, it may be possible to establish the vintage of each piece of regulated
dry-cleaning equipment at each establishment. There may be a greater chance
of exit corresponding to years in which some piece of PCE-using equipment
reaches 15 years of age, the point at which the equipment will need to be
retired.
4. Seek detailed information on SCAQMD’s financial incentives program for
conversion to green technologies. According to Ong (2012), SCAQMD offered
financial incentive for conversion and gave establishments in EJ neighborhoods
priority in applying for these grants. Despite the pro-environmental justice
focus of these grants, the take-up rate for dry cleaners in low-income and
minority areas was less than in other areas. (Ong has 2002-2006 permit data
with information on 343 grants.) Our findings suggest that even with the
subsidy for conversion to green technologies, dry cleaners in “environmental
justice” neighborhoods were relatively more likely to close than those elsewhere,
thus depriving these communities of the convenience of a neighborhood dry
cleaner unless these businesses are merely sold.
5. As an extension and separate paper, learn as much as we can about the dry
cleaners located in close proximity to each of the pollution monitors that
measure concentrations of PCE. The objective would be to explore whether
the regulation reduced concentrations of PCE.
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6. To examine the effect of regulation on exits from a slightly different vantage
point, create a dependent variable defined as the number of exits at the Census
tract level. Examine how our set of regressors affected the number of exits in
each Census tract.
7. Further analysis of the SCAQMD sample: It may be possible to analyze the
huge spike in the installation of “dry to dry” ventilation systems, intended
to keep PCE contained. We know when they applied for and received these
permits.
8. Compare NETS data for California to the analogous data for Arizona and
Oregon, Massachusetts, Illinois and New York states. We have not had as
much success in gathering agency-level data on PCE-regulated equipment for
all of these other jurisdictions, but it will be possible to analyze the NETS
data, along with the County Business Patterns and Neighborhood Change
Database/American Community Survey data for these other states, where
regulation has been somewhat different than in California.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER II TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics (240 respondents, 2 choice sets each)
Variable Definition N Mean Std. Min. Max.
Dev.
By choice set:
pounds (qji ) package weight 480 2.24 0.567 1.5 3
total price conventional 480 5.88 1.87 2.68 10.47
product
free-range product 480 7.14 2.46 2.84 15.57
humanely raised 480 8.61 2.94 3.13 18.27
product
price per pound conventional product 480 2.63 0.48 1.79 3.49
free-range product 480 3.20 0.71 1.84 5.19
humanely raised 480 3.86 0.88 1.94 6.09
product
Across
respondents:
1(female) =1 if female 240 0.652 - - -
household sizea including respondent 236 2.71 1.32 1 8
1(college grad) =1 if college grad 240 0.402 - - -
conservatism approx. linear ratingb 240 3.61 1.56 1 7
H. healthiness* " 240 5.38 1.29 1 7
H. improves " 240 5.20 1.78 1 7
well-being*
antibiotic concernsa " 199 3.86 2.23 1 7
*H = humanely raised product
a A handful of subjects did not answer the household size question; the question about
antibiotic concerns was a late addition. Indicator variables are used to control for missing
values, and slopes are conditional on data being available.
b We cannot statistically reject assumptions that these ratings enter linearly, so they will be
treated as continuous variables, to control the size of the parameter space.
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TABLE 2. Simple Model, Homogeneous Preferences (240 respondents, 480 choices)
Variable Coefficients
-(total price) (βY ) 0.4282***
(0.0727)
1(Conventional) 1(Free-range) 1(Humane)
base coefficient differential differential
pounds (qji ) (βC) 2.368*** (δF ) 0.1066 (δH) 0.2464**
(0.288) (0.071) (0.101)
Log L -541.578
a Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses (***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the
5% level). Coefficients arrayed to emphasize baseline marginal utility and differentials for free-
range and humanely raised products, to be generalized in Table 3. Parameter estimates in these
two models are produced by Stata’s clogit algorithm, with errors clustered on the respondent
identifier.
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TABLE 3. Parsimonious Model, Heterogeneous Preferences (240 respondents, 480
choices)
Variable Coefficientsa
-(total price) (βY ) 0.4927***
(0.102)
-(total price) 0.1691**
× 1(female) (0.079)
1(Conventional) 1(Free-range) 1(Humane)
base coefficient differential differential
pounds (qji ) (βC) 10.7029*** (δF ) -0.0760 (δH) –1.4942**
(0.560) (0.502) (0.712)
× household size -0.2479*** -0.1108** -0.1278*
(0.093) (0.056) (0.069)
× 1(college grad) -0.8934** 0.2566* 0.2930*
(0.362) (0.146) (0.164)
× conservatism - -0.0855* -0.1194*
(0.047) (0.061)
× H. healthiness - 0.1606**
(0.068)
× H. improves well-being - 0.1719*** 0.1615***
(0.038) (0.056)
× antibiotic concerns - 0.1670*** 0.1988***
(0.039) (0.052)
Log L -436.718
a Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses (***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the
5% level, *significant at the 10% level). Coefficients arrayed to emphasize baseline marginal utility
and differentials for free-range and humanely raised products. Parameter estimates are produced
by Stata’s clogit algorithm, with errors clustered on the respondent identifier. Note that panel
data methods are unnecessary because the explanatory variables are either fixed or randomized,
and therefore do not covary with any individual heterogeneity, observed or unobserved. Model also
includes unreported incidental parameters on indicators for the availability of data on “household
size” for all three product types and on “antibiotic concerns” for the free-range and humanely raised
products.
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TABLE 4. Derivatives of marginal WTP premium for humane product
With respect to: For Females: For Males:
household size (# of persons) -$0.19 -$0.25
(-$0.42, $0.01) (-$0.62, -$0.02)
1(college grad) (0,1) $0.45 $0.61
(-$0.04, $1.05) (-$0.05, $1.49)
conservatism (1 to 7) -$0.18 -$0.24
(-$0.36, $0.00) (-$0.53, $0.00)
H. healthiness (1 to 7) $0.24 $0.33
($0.04, $0.47) ($0.05, $0.73)
H. improves well-being (1 to 7) $0.25 $0.33
($0.06, $0.43) ($0.08, $0.70)
antibiotic concerns (1 to 7) $0.30 $0.41
($0.15, $0.47) ($0.20, $0.74)
We report medians and 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution of the calculated
derivative, based on 1000 draws from the assumed joint normally distributed maximum
likelihood parameter estimates. Intervals thus reflect the precision of parameter estimates.
For full results, see Appendix Table D-1.
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TABLE 5. Two-Class Latent Class Model (240 respondents, 480 choices)
Variable Preference Classes
Class 1 Class 2
-(Total price) 0.240*** 0.175*
(0.0742) (0.0983)
pounds (qji ) 1.31*** 1.48***
(0.234) (0.294)
... × free-range 0.385*** -0.510***
(0.100) (0.142)
... × humanely raised 0.430*** -0.646***
(0.143) (0.187)
Variable Class separation index
(propensity to be in Class 2)
constant 12.7
(8.99)
household size 1.17*
(0.686)
conservatism 0.212
(0.303)
H. improves well-being -1.34*
(0.711)
antibiotic concerns -1.64
(1.05)
Incidental (Non-missing value indicators)
have(household size) -10.5
(7.06)
have(antibiotics concerns) 5.50*
(3.25)
Max Log L 535.52
asymptotic standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1 - One example of a choice set
– If every product in a choice scenario seems too expensive, choose “None.”
– If you would look for something else instead, choose “None.”
– If you never buy the meat product(s) being described, choose “None.”
Choice Scenario #1 (Chicken Breasts)
Suppose you have come to your usual food store. You are considering whether to
buy a 1.5-pound package of chicken breasts. The store offers three brands of chicken
breasts that look the same. The color, size and fat content of each brand are very
similar. The only visible difference is that one brand is marked “Conventional,” one
brand is marked “Free-range,” and the third brand is marked “Humane.” The prices
are also different.
Keeping in mind your household budget, which would you choose? (check ONE)
A B C None
Type Conventional Free-range Humane
Package size 1.5 lbs 1.5 lbs 1.5 lbs
Price $ 3.09/lb $ 4.09/lb $4.84/lb
Total cost $4.63 $ 6.14 $ 7.26 $ 0
I prefer: 2 2 2 2
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER III TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE 6. Descriptive Statistics (N=6795)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Dependent variable: Proportion Yes on Prop 21:
yes/(yes+no) 0.429 0.11 0.09 0.843
1. Gross price of Prop 21:
Price (=$18 × veh/hhld) 43.60 11.25 2.05 223.89
2. Median household income:
Median tract household income 65,212 29,889 11,148 226,509
3. Political ideologies (gubernatorial vote shares):
Dem. gov vote share (omitted category) 0.576 0.17 0.152 0.953
Green gov vote share 0.014 0.006 0 0.072
Peace/Free. gov vote share 0.012 0.011 0 0.109
Rep. gov vote share 0.368 0.167 0.015 0.807
Libert. gov vote share 0.015 0.007 0 0.099
Am. Indep. gov vote share 0.017 0.01 0 0.088
4. Environmental preferences:
Share hybrid vehicles in tract 0.003 0.002 0 0.046
Share pickups in tract 0.094 0.079 0.005 1.024
Mean(vehicle age) 3.629 1.17 0.137 21.373
Var(vehicle age) 0.117 0.419 0 13.57
Nominal congress LCV score 58.13 42.755 0 100
5. Government fiscal responsibility:
Bond rating data available 0.799
1(Some lower-rated muni. bonds) 0.435
6. Salience of state parks:
Distance from tract to nearest park (miles) 7.157 6.751 0 90.596
Size of nearest park (square miles) 6.086 31.736 0 933.817
Size of tract (small=urban) 0.551 4.14 0.001 206.956
Continued on next page
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Table 6. – continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Fishing licenses/hhld 0.086 0.068 0.005 0.664
Hunting licenses/hhld 0.019 0.029 0 0.473
7. Substitutes (counts w/in 20 km):
Local parks 160.911 120.572 0 455
Local historical sites 6.607 7.162 0 34
State parks (not beaches) 1.01 1.296 0 6
State beaches 1.016 1.745 0 10
State historical sites 0.635 0.837 0 8
National parks 0.001 0.027 0 1
National seashores 0 0.021 0 1
National recreation areas 0.042 0.201 0 1
Museums 12.029 12.825 0 43
Attractions (theme parks, etc.) 21.629 32.101 0 121
8. Ecological regions:
Central Basin and Range 0.001
Sonoran Desert 0.016
Cascades 0
E. Cascades Slopes/Foothills 0.001
9. Other sociodemographic controls:
Median housing value 2.937 1.669 0.345 20.51
High-cost loans per 1000 0.036 0.054 0 1.778
Share of single mother households 0.109 0.075 0 0.679
Farm/fish/forestry 0.015 0.05 0 0.589
Constr/extract/mainten 0.093 0.056 0 0.425
Product/transp/materialmoving 0.117 0.081 0 0.594
Sales/office 0.252 0.061 0.03 0.562
Services 0.174 0.079 0 0.635
Agric/forestry/mining 0.023 0.061 0 0.615
Arts/ent/recr/accom/food 0.091 0.052 0 0.564
Construction 0.076 0.047 0 0.378
Inf/fin/ins/re/rent/lease 0.099 0.055 0 0.439
Manufacturing 0.106 0.063 0 0.458
Prof/scient/mgt/admin/wastemgt 0.119 0.056 0 0.404
Retail trade 0.11 0.041 0 0.371
Transp/warehous/utilities 0.047 0.031 0 0.257
Under 5 years 0.073 0.03 0 0.211
5 to 9 years 0.067 0.026 0 0.17
10 to 14 years 0.072 0.027 0 0.196
15 to 19 years 0.072 0.035 0 0.705
20 to 24 years 0.07 0.042 0.002 0.66
25 to 49 years 0.364 0.073 0.052 0.805
50 to 64 years 0.169 0.054 0 0.432
Continued on next page
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Table 6. – continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
65 to 69 years 0.033 0.018 0 0.156
70 to 74 years 0.026 0.016 0 0.162
75 years and over 0.055 0.039 0 0.451
White (omitted category) 0.62 0.21 0 1
Asian 0.121 0.144 0 0.927
Black/AfricanAmerican 0.061 0.103 0 0.941
Hispanic/Latino 0.355 0.266 0 1
Hawaiian/Pac.Island 0.004 0.01 0 0.144
Other race 0.153 0.144 0 0.803
Multiracial 0.034 0.024 0 0.212
NOTE: There are 5 omitted industries (Armed Forces, Education/Health Care, Public
Administration, Wholesale, and Other) and 2 omitted occupations (Armed Forces and
management/professionals)
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TABLE 7. Main Results
(1a) (1b) (2) (3)
Variables Log-odds Marginals Log-odds Log-odds
(clustered on (at the means) (not SARAR(1,1)
counties) clustered) model
1. Gross price of Prop 21:
price (=18×veh/hhld) -0.00400** -0.00253*** -0.00400*** -0.00331***
(-2.01) (-5.03) (-4.88) (-4.15)
···× (Grn. gov vote share) -0.241*** -0.241*** -0.150***
(-3.39) (-6.63) (-4.54)
···× (Peace/Free. gov vote share) 0.0785 0.0785*** 0.0385**
(1.60) (4.66) (2.85)
···× (Rep. gov vote share) 0.00754*** 0.00754*** 0.00362**
(3.93) (4.69) (2.35)
···× (Libert. gov vote share) 0.0485 0.0485 0.0242
(0.98) (1.31) (0.70)
···× (Am. Indep. gov vote share) 0.0192 0.0192 0.0514**
(0.55) (0.79) (2.32)
2. Median household income:
log(inc) (=log(med.income/10000)) 0.0533 -0.0406* 0.0533** 0.0107
(0.68) (-1.93) (2.10) (0.45)
···× (Green gov vote share) 2.673 2.673*** 1.479*
(1.61) (2.78) (1.71)
···× (Peace/Free. gov vote share) -6.901*** -6.901*** -6.730***
(-6.32) (-8.68) (-9.37)
···× (Rep. gov vote share) -0.0783 -0.0783* -0.0333
(-0.76) (-1.81) (-0.83)
···× (Libert. gov vote share) -8.851*** -8.851*** -6.217***
(-4.22) (-9.55) (-7.39)
···× (Am. Indep. gov vote share) 1.285 1.285* 0.452
(1.35) (1.79) (0.71)
3. Political ideologies (gubernatorial vote shares):
Dem. gov vote share (omitted category)
Green gov vote share 16.530*** 4.657*** 16.530*** 11.200***
(4.35) (4.46) (9.10) (6.77)
Peace/Free. gov vote share -17.660*** -10.742*** -17.660*** -15.140***
(-5.32) (-6.86) (-15.74) (-14.24)
Rep. gov vote share -2.668*** -2.299*** -2.668*** -2.294***
(-20.21) (-20.84) (-33.54) (-29.14)
Libert. gov vote share -9.625*** -2.861*** -9.625*** -4.946***
(-4.12) (-3.18) (-5.32) (-2.96)
Am. Indep. gov vote share -7.796*** -7.635*** -7.796*** -9.653***
(-4.10) (-8.06) (-5.97) (-8.21)
Continued on next page
109
Table 7. – continued from previous page
(1) Marginals (2) (3)
Variables Log-odds (at the means) Log-odds Log-odds
(clustered on (not SARAR(1,1)
counties) clustered) model
4. Environmental preferences:
Share hybrid vehicles in tract 12.95*** 12.95*** 12.56***
(4.60) (7.34) (7.91)
Share pickups in tract 0.0205 0.0205 0.0146
(0.17) (0.34) (0.27)
Mean(vehicle age) 0.00625 0.006 0.00625** -0.0105***
(1.08) (1.02) (2.13) (-3.58)
Var(vehicle age) 0.0683*** 0.0554*** 0.0683*** 0.0837***
(2.80) (2.75) (4.10) (3.69)
Mean(vehicle age) × Var(vehicle age) -0.00354*** -0.00354*** -0.00330***
(-2.77) (-3.86) (-2.72)
Nominal congress LCV score -0.000133 -0.000133* -0.000295***
(-0.59) (-1.81) (-3.52)
5. Government fiscal responsibility:
Bond rating data available 0.00065 0.00065 0.00772
(0.04) (0.10) (1.09)
1(Some lower-rated muni. bonds) -0.0127 -0.0127** -0.0254***
(-1.06) (-2.43) (-4.61)
6. Salience of state parks:
Distance from tract to nearest park (miles) -0.00503*** -0.00503*** -0.00429***
(-4.81) (-11.43) (-9.01)
Size of nearest park (square miles) 0.000162 0.000162** 0.00683***
(1.56) (2.31) (2.84)
Size of census tract (small=urban) -0.00127* -0.00127** -0.00180***
(-1.91) (-2.197) (-3.55)
Fishing licenses/hh 0.231 0.231*** -0.0383
(0.68) (2.61) (-0.41)
Hunting licenses/hh -1.533** -1.533*** -0.911***
(-2.238) (-8.23) (-5.12)
7. Substitutes (w/in 20 km):
Local parks -0.000173* -0.000173*** 0.000427***
(-1.85) (-5.89) (10.46)
Local historical sites 0.00540** 0.00540*** 0.00244***
(2.57) (7.39) (2.99)
State parks (not beaches) -0.0253** -0.0253*** -0.0352***
(-2.89) (-9.72) (-11.58)
State beaches 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.00787***
(2.86) (7.87) (3.55)
State historical sites 0.0218** 0.0218*** -0.00189
(2.31) (7.11) (-0.55)
National parks -0.115* -0.115 -0.115*
(-1.81) (-1.48) (-1.71)
National seashores -0.234*** -0.234** -0.234**
(-3.56) (-2.12) (-2.45)
National recreation areas -0.0877*** -0.0877*** -0.0885***
(-3.04) (-6.48) (-5.80)
Museums 0.00321** 0.00321*** 0.00136***
(2.53) (6.34) (2.90)
Attractions (theme parks, etc.) -0.00346*** -0.00346*** -0.00236***
(-7.09) (-21.31) (-13.89)
Continued on next page
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Table 7. – continued from previous page
(1) Marginals (2) (3)
Variables Log-odds (at the means) Log-odds Log-odds
(clustered on (not SARAR(1,1)
counties) clustered) model
8. Ecological regions:
7 other regions (omitted categories)
Central Basin and Range 0.160* 0.160** 0.150**
(1.88) (2.34) (2.48)
Sonoran Desert -0.107* -0.107*** -0.155***
(-1.91) (-5.58) (-6.42)
Cascades 0.189*** 0.189 0.271*
(2.99) (1.10) (1.83)
E. Cascades Slopes/Foothills 0.405*** 0.405*** 0.347***
(4.33) (6.06) (5.93)
9. Other sociodemographic controls:
Median housing value 0.0201*** 0.0201*** 0.0184***
(5.60) (8.36) (8.30)
High-cost loans per 1000 -0.116** -0.116*** -0.115***
(-2.03) (-2.59) (-2.92)
Share of single mother households 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.0568
(3.80) (3.40) (1.58)
Farm/fish/forestry -0.228 -0.228 -0.0432
(-0.92) (-1.52) (-0.32)
Constr/extract/mainten -0.489*** -0.489*** -0.430***
(-4.82) (-6.21) (-6.36)
Product/transp/materialmoving -0.482*** -0.482*** -0.318***
(-5.40) (-8.43) (-6.19)
Sales/office -0.415*** -0.415*** -0.290***
(-7.28) (-8.35) (-6.69)
Services -0.158* -0.158*** -0.128***
(-1.84) (-3.24) (-2.95)
Agric/forestry/mining -0.179 -0.179 -0.436***
(-0.91) (-1.39) (-3.70)
Arts/ent/recr/accom/food 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.263***
(3.78) (4.45) (4.65)
Construction 0.265** 0.265*** 0.271***
(2.57) (3.27) (3.86)
Inf/fin/ins/re/rent/lease -0.117 -0.117** 0.0468
(-1.29) (-1.99) (0.90)
Manufacturing 0.173 0.173*** -0.0806*
(1.35) (3.30) (-1.72)
Prof/scient/mgt/admin/wastemgt 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.174***
(4.00) (5.19) (3.61)
Retail trade 0.0757 0.0757 -0.0499
(1.09) (1.18) (-0.91)
Transp/warehous/utilities -0.446*** -0.446*** -0.388***
(-2.72) (-5.19) (-5.152)
Under 5 years -0.172 -0.172* -0.254***
(-1.22) (-1.76) (-2.99)
5 to 9 years -0.403** -0.403*** -0.502***
(-2.60) (-3.58) (-5.16)
10 to 14 years -0.490** -0.490*** -0.486***
(-2.52) (-4.57) (-5.19)
15 to 19 years -0.107 -0.107 -0.135**
(-1.06) (-1.50) (-2.19)
20 to 24 years 0.306** 0.306*** 0.219***
(2.13) (4.54) (3.50)
25 to 49 years (omitted category)
Continued on next page
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(1) Marginals (2) (3)
Variables Log-odds (at the means) Log-odds Log-odds
(clustered on (not SARAR(1,1)
counties) clustered) model
50 to 64 years -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.160**
(-3.22) (-3.53) (-2.81)
65 to 69 years -0.360 -0.360** -0.275**
(-1.65) (-2.36) (-2.11)
70 to 74 years -0.339* -0.339* -0.328**
(-1.67) (-1.96) (-2.21)
75 years and over -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.352***
(-3.82) (-3.99) (-5.49)
White (omitted category)
Asian -0.360*** -0.360*** -0.265***
(-5.87) (-17.34) (-11.70)
Black/AfricanAmerican -0.995*** -0.995*** -0.841***
(-11.27) (-31.79) (-26.72)
Hispanic/Latino -0.0910 -0.2178** -0.0910** -0.0681**
(-1.16) (-4.09) (-2.56) (-1.98)
···× log(inc) 0.241** 0.241*** 0.220***
(2.53) (7.01) (7.06)
Hawaiian/Pac.Island -0.0679 -0.0679 -0.257
(-0.19) (-0.32) (-1.38)
Other race -0.124** -0.124*** -0.0850***
(-2.15) (-4.02) (-2.75)
Multiracial -0.0946 -0.0946 -0.140*
(-0.73) (-1.00) (-1.68)
Constant 1.449*** 1.449*** 1.373***
(13.68) (25.81) (25.20)
Parameters, SARAR(1,1):
λ - - 4.03e-05***
(15.14)
ρ - - 0.000712***
(71.80)
σ2 - - 0.0216***
(58.29)
Observations 6795 6795 6795
R-squared 0.869 0.869 -
Log-likelihood 2403 2403 3344
NOTES: Marginal effects at the means are entered only for variables which do not enter the model in a simple linear and additively
separable form (so that their marginal effect is identical with their fitted coefficient).The option for errors clustered on counties
is not offered in our SARAR(1,1) estimation algorithm, so we provide the non-clustered OLS estimates for comparison to the
SARAR(1,1) results. Implied marginals at the means for the SARAR(1,1) specifications cannot be calculated trivially using the
"margins" command in Stata 12. Political parties for gubernatorial vote shares in the November 2010 election are sorted according
to left-leaning and then right-leaning platforms and within these two groups by mainstream and then fringe groups. Democrats
are listed first because the democratic candidate prevailed in this election. Among the ecological regions, we found no statistically
significant differences among the following omitted categories: Northern Basin and Range, Arizona/New Mexico Plateau, Mojave
Basin and Range, CA Coast. Sage/Chaparral/Oak, S. & Baja CA Pine-Oak Mtns, Klamath Mountains, and Coast Range.
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TABLE 8. Holdout Samples
Actual Fitted Share Yes In 99%
County Population # Tracts Share Yes Point 95% Interval Interval?
Alameda 1,457,095 313 0.564 0.556 (0.544, 0.567) X
Alpine 1,153 1 0.437 0.493 (0.476, 0.511)
Amador 38,039 7 0.335 0.373 (0.356, 0.389)
Butte 217,917 41 0.372 0.396 (0.381, 0.411)
Calaveras 46,548 7 0.368 0.371 (0.353, 0.387) X
Colusa 21,001 5 0.253 0.276 (0.256, 0.299) X
Contra Costa 1,015,571 164 0.467 0.489 (0.478, 0.501)
Del Norte 28,729 6 0.402 0.396 (0.378, 0.413) X
El Dorado 175,941 34 0.407 0.393 (0.369, 0.417) X
Fresno 890,750 155 0.31 0.321 (0.309, 0.332) X
Glenn 27,891 5 0.279 0.315 (0.292, 0.338)
Humboldt 129,003 26 0.48 0.521 (0.496, 0.545)
Imperial 160,034 26 0.319 0.348 (0.325, 0.372)
Inyo 17,438 6 0.3 0.295 (0.275, 0.315) X
Kern 775,555 134 0.274 0.283 (0.273, 0.293) X
Kings 146,696 24 0.365 0.347 (0.331, 0.364) X
Lake 64,756 12 0.391 0.415 (0.401, 0.428)
Lassen 34,428 7 0.316 0.297 (0.274, 0.323) X
Los Angeles 9,785,295 1963 0.427 0.434 (0.426, 0.441) X
Madera 144,794 19 0.335 0.312 (0.301, 0.324) X
Marin 246,711 49 0.593 0.575 (0.560, 0.591) X
Mariposa 17,865 4 0.53 0.512 (0.494, 0.531) X
Mendocino 86,030 18 0.515 0.524 (0.503, 0.545) X
Merced 242,235 46 0.305 0.307 (0.297, 0.316) X
Modoc 9,162 4 0.252 0.28 (0.234, 0.326) X
Mono 12,925 2 0.425 0.437 (0.406, 0.468) X
Monterey 404,922 78 0.55 0.494 (0.469, 0.517) X
Napa 132,173 25 0.451 0.482 (0.467, 0.496)
Nevada 97,063 18 0.459 0.461 (0.446, 0.476) X
Orange 2,976,831 565 0.349 0.347 (0.340, 0.355) X
Placer 332,059 49 0.41 0.368 (0.356, 0.380) X
Plumas 20,550 5 0.333 0.344 (0.318, 0.372) X
Riverside 2,036,304 336 0.341 0.338 (0.331, 0.346) X
Sacramento 1,375,605 269 0.463 0.446 (0.437, 0.456) X
San Benito 54,752 8 0.457 0.398 (0.379, 0.415) X
San Bernardino 1,986,635 236 0.331 0.335 (0.330, 0.339) X
San Diego 2,987,543 581 0.395 0.4 (0.394, 0.407) X
San Francisco 797,271 156 0.603 0.616 (0.605, 0.626) X
San Joaquin 664,641 120 0.363 0.348 (0.339, 0.357) X
San Luis Obispo 262,149 41 0.438 0.421 (0.407, 0.435) X
San Mateo 701,886 151 0.536 0.54 (0.529, 0.551) X
Santa Barbara 402,025 82 0.466 0.435 (0.418, 0.452) X
Santa Clara 1,729,378 331 0.532 0.517 (0.505, 0.529) X
Santa Cruz 251,398 52 0.599 0.564 (0.544, 0.584) X
Shasta 179,387 33 0.378 0.408 (0.390, 0.428)
Sierra 3,240 1 0.389 0.355 (0.328, 0.384) X
Continued on next page
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Actual Fitted Share Yes In 99%
County Population # Tracts Share Yes Point 95% Interval Interval?
Siskiyou 44,404 14 0.539 0.451 (0.409, 0.492) X
Solano 406,461 78 0.429 0.425 (0.413, 0.437) X
Sonoma 464,218 86 0.574 0.54 (0.521, 0.558) X
Stanislaus 505,165 89 0.336 0.342 (0.334, 0.349) X
Sutter 90,731 18 0.309 0.319 (0.306, 0.333) X
Tehama 60,601 11 0.392 0.401 (0.375, 0.425) X
Trinity 13,922 4 0.319 0.34 (0.313, 0.366) X
Tulare 416,299 75 0.248 0.274 (0.258, 0.290)
Tuolumne 55,761 10 0.373 0.391 (0.378, 0.405)
Ventura 792,313 148 0.421 0.403 (0.392, 0.415) X
Yolo 192,974 36 0.53 0.507 (0.495, 0.520) X
Yuba 70,906 11 0.496 0.434 (0.416, 0.450) X
NOTES: For each county, we use that county as a hold-out sample of Census tracts and fit the
model in Table 2 based on tracts in the remaining counties. Based on these parameters, we
predict the proportion of votes in favor of Prop 21 for each of the tracts in the hold-out county.
Counts of tracts may fall short of the total in some counties because of missing data in our
estimating sample.
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FIGURE 1. Differential support for Prop 21
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FIGURE 2. Annual cost of Prop 21 per household
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FIGURE 3. Tract level break-even fees
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FIGURE 4. Political shift needed to pass Prop 21, holding constant population that
voted
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TABLE 9. Descriptive Statistics – California (N=9,044)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Full sample Stay Move Close
0 = stat quo; 1=move; 2=out of biz 0.0818 0 1 2
(0.390) (0) (0) (0)
annual firm sales 15.25 15.28 19.25 13.81
(22.54) (22.50) (28.61) (22.55)
Estab Empl at Loc (repl on move) 3.968 3.974 5.002 3.670
(5.539) (5.471) (8.196) (6.675)
tract hhld income 7.184 7.202 7.174 6.737
(3.555) (3.564) (3.506) (3.317)
tract % Hispanic 0.254 0.254 0.248 0.266
(0.217) (0.217) (0.215) (0.221)
tract % Black 0.0623 0.0621 0.0615 0.0679
(0.111) (0.111) (0.106) (0.119)
tract % Asian/other 0.274 0.273 0.296 0.287
(0.171) (0.170) (0.186) (0.174)
ever regulated? (PCE/HC) - - - -
... x Korean-owned - - - -
% chng, county qtr1 payroll 0.0462 0.0458 0.0479 0.0561
(0.0666) (0.0668) (0.0570) (0.0602)
% chng, county establish. 0.00828 0.00814 0.0105 0.0113
(0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0149)
% chng, county employment 0.00744 0.00714 0.0104 0.0147
(0.0367) (0.0368) (0.0308) (0.0328)
Observations 9,044 4,974 458 3,612
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TABLE 10. Descriptive Statistics - SCAQMD (N=4,874)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Full sample Stay Move Close
0 = stat quo; 1=move; 2=out of biz 0.0770 0 1 2
(0.379) (0) (0) (0)
annual firm sales 15.38 15.41 21.42 13.81
(25.62) (25.57) (34.72) (25.38)
Estab Empl at Loc (repl on move) 3.942 3.951 5.397 3.537
(5.980) (5.932) (9.912) (6.531)
tract hhld income 7.088 7.106 7.134 6.593
(3.566) (3.576) (3.418) (3.263)
tract % Hispanic 0.301 0.300 0.301 0.318
(0.237) (0.237) (0.248) (0.239)
tract % Black 0.0681 0.0680 0.0615 0.0722
(0.127) (0.127) (0.113) (0.129)
tract % Asian/other 0.293 0.292 0.310 0.312
(0.173) (0.173) (0.184) (0.174)
ever regulated? (PCE/HC) 0.436 0.447 0.342 0.158
(0.496) (0.497) (0.475) (0.365)
... x Korean-owned 0.217 0.223 0.179 0.0625
(0.412) (0.416) (0.385) (0.242)
% chng, county qtr1 payroll 0.0399 0.0395 0.0407 0.0492
(0.0498) (0.0500) (0.0401) (0.0426)
% chng, county establish. 0.00958 0.00943 0.0118 0.0133
(0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0137) (0.0137)
% chng, county employment 0.00533 0.00508 0.00596 0.0120
(0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0247) (0.0269)
Observations 4,874 2,784 234 1,856
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TABLE 11. Descriptive Statistics - not SCAQMD (N=4,170)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Full sample Stay Move Close
0 = stat quo; 1=move; 2=out of biz 0.0876 0 1 2
(0.403) (0) (0) (0)
annual firm sales 15.08 15.12 16.99 13.80
(18.15) (18.10) (20.18) (19.11)
Estab Empl at Loc (repl on move) 3.998 4.003 4.589 3.811
(4.956) (4.854) (5.888) (6.822)
tract hhld income 7.300 7.319 7.215 6.889
(3.539) (3.545) (3.602) (3.367)
tract % Hispanic 0.198 0.197 0.193 0.211
(0.175) (0.174) (0.157) (0.185)
tract % Black 0.0554 0.0550 0.0614 0.0634
(0.0879) (0.0870) (0.0973) (0.106)
tract % Asian/other 0.251 0.251 0.281 0.261
(0.164) (0.164) (0.186) (0.169)
ever regulated? (PCE/HC) - - - -
... x Korean-owned - - - -
% chng, county qtr1 payroll 0.0539 0.0535 0.0553 0.0634
(0.0817) (0.0820) (0.0698) (0.0737)
% chng, county establish. 0.00670 0.00658 0.00911 0.00914
(0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0157)
% chng, county employment 0.00998 0.00963 0.0150 0.0175
(0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0355) (0.0378)
Observations 4,170 2,190 224 1,756
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TABLE 12. Binomial Logit Models
Variable (1) (2) (3)
1(SCAQMD) 0.077 0.0684 0.0567
(0.343) (0.304) (0.251)
1(SCAQMD)×1990(base year) 0 0 0
1(SCAQMD)×1991 0.0441 0.0507 0.0442
(0.156) (0.179) (0.156)
1(SCAQMD)×1992 -0.0398 -0.0583 -0.0612
(-0.134) (-0.197) (-0.206)
1(SCAQMD)×1993 -0.123 -0.136 -0.142
(-0.421) (-0.465) (-0.485)
1(SCAQMD)×1994 -0.288 -0.272 -0.287
(-0.907) (-0.856) (-0.902)
1(SCAQMD)×1995 -0.226 -0.224 -0.241
(-0.842) (-0.833) (-0.897)
1(SCAQMD)×1996 -0.504* -0.485* -0.499*
(-1.933) (-1.859) (-1.912)
1(SCAQMD)×1997 -0.0736 -0.0835 -0.103
(-0.288) (-0.327) (-0.403)
1(SCAQMD)×1998 -0.354 -0.366 -0.389
(-1.369) (-1.415) (-1.504)
1(SCAQMD)×1999 -0.133 -0.151 -0.181
(-0.521) (-0.584) (-0.703)
1(SCAQMD)×2000 -0.0754 -0.146 -0.18
(-0.285) (-0.541) (-0.670)
1(SCAQMD)×2001 -0.251 -0.236 -0.274
(-0.961) (-0.894) (-1.041)
1(SCAQMD)×2002 -0.25 -0.2 -0.244
(-0.954) (-0.752) (-0.917)
1(SCAQMD)×2003 -0.13 -0.0886 -0.134
(-0.480) (-0.322) (-0.488)
1(SCAQMD)×2004 -0.183 -0.177 -0.219
(-0.706) (-0.676) (-0.839)
1(SCAQMD)×2005 -0.244 -0.192 -0.236
(-0.958) (-0.743) (-0.911)
1(SCAQMD)×2006 -0.115 -0.0981 -0.135
(-0.416) (-0.354) (-0.486)
1(SCAQMD)×2007 -0.24 -0.202 -0.239
(-0.866) (-0.726) (-0.858)
1(SCAQMD)×2008 -0.570** -0.569** -0.604**
(-2.087) (-2.081) (-2.208)
% chng, county qtr1 payroll -1.174** -1.207**
(-1.973) (-2.002)
% chng, county establish. -1.927 -1.049
(-0.946) (-0.508)
% chng, county employment 2.056** 2.043**
(2.301) (2.272)
Annual firm sales -0.00385
(-1.398)
# employees (firm) -0.000485
(-0.0440)
Tract hhld income -0.0179**
(-2.328)
Tract % Hispanic 0.0561
(0.495)
Tract % Black 0.278*
(1.668)
Tract % Asian/other 0.504***
(3.885)
Constant -3.670*** -3.613*** -3.615***
(-22.04) (-21.01) (-19.64)
Observations 88,504 88,504 88,504
Errors clustered on DUNS # DUNS # DUNS #
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 13. Binomial Logit Model - Treated/Not Treated
Variable (1) (2) (3) Margins Margins
Not SC SC
Treated -0.215*** -0.220*** -0.250***
(-4.791) (-4.197) (-6.967)
1(SCAQMD) -0.0816* -0.0940** -0.103 -0.00539*** -0.00539***
(-1.709) (-2.299) (-0.420) (-2.641) (-2.641)
% chng, county qtr1 payroll -1.008** -1.071**
(-2.307) (-2.335)
% chng, county establish. 4.929** 5.220**
(1.993) (2.112)
% chng, county employment 2.432*** 2.551***
(2.871) (2.827)
Tract % Hispanic 0.301 0.0126 -0.00418
(1.616) (1.574) (-0.931)
1(SCAQMD)×Tract % Hispanic -0.413*
(-1.857)
Tract % Black 0.719*** 0.0302*** 0.00859***
(3.156) (3.407) (6.789)
1(SCAQMD)×Tract % Black -0.488**
(-2.208)
Tract % Asian/other 0.400** 0.0168** 0.0345***
(2.453) (2.561) (6.631)
1(SCAQMD)×Tract % Asian/other 0.529**
(2.394)
Tract hhld income -0.00339 -0.000142 -0.000353
(-0.367) (-0.364) (-0.433)
1(SCAQMD)×c.hhinc_mean -0.00613
(-0.233)
Annual firm sales -0.0026
(-1.077)
# employees (firm) -0.00522
(-0.385)
Constant -3.063*** -3.085*** -3.206***
(-71.40) (-92.95) (-24.44)
Observations 88,504 88,504 88,504 88,504 88,504
Errors clustered on County County County County County
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 14. Pollution Concentrations
Evolution of PCE across monitors and over time (log-linear)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable log(avg) log(median) log(90th %ile) log(75th %ile)
1(SCAQMD) 48.78** 52.47*** 56.32** 52.94***
(2.25) (2.67) (2.40) (2.61)
year -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.120***
(-18.15) (-23.21) (-20.94) (-23.92)
1(SCAQMD)×year -0.0239** -0.0257*** -0.0277** -0.0260**
(-2.21) (-2.63) (-2.36) (-2.56)
Constant 229.9*** 231.3*** 237.2*** 237.7***
(17.95) (22.88) (20.75) (23.64)
Observations 220 219 219 219
R-squared 0.800 0.823 0.801 0.837
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
124
FIGURE 5. Total PCE Consumption Over Time. Source:
http://www.epa.gov/dfe/pubs/projects/garment/graph1.htm
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FIGURE 6. Map of South Coast Air Quality Management District Jurisdiction
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FIGURE 7. Instances of dry cleaners closing or changing owners
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FIGURE 8. Sales levels by year
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FIGURE 9. Effect of Korean Ownership on Exits by Year
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FIGURE 10. Exit propensities by year
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FIGURE 11. Counts of cleaners
131
FIGURE 12. Locations of Monitors
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FIGURE 13. Panel Structure
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FIGURE 14. PCE Averages (1990-2009) - SCAQMD
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FIGURE 15. PCE Averages (1990-2009) - Outside SCAQMD
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